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INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW

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Editor:

Years ago, in a letter addressed to the spokesmen of American Trotskyism, I discussed a theory which considered the present Russian state to be a result of the replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the dictatorship of the peasantry. Historically this theory appeared as a trend within the Russian (and German) left-opposition decades ago. I maintain, as before, that it is the only consistently Marxist-Leninist theory of the post-revolutionary Russian state.

Meanwhile, in the very latest book on Russia, *The Taproot of Soviet Society,* 1962, Mr. N. Vakar, a university professor, developed a theory of "Soviet society" as one with "peasant taproots" and the Russian government as that of "ex-peasants." Before the members of what is historically known as the left oppositionist movement get acquainted with this latest achievement of "Sovietology," a few words in connection with it might prove instructive.

It is to be considered as historically inevitable that the enemies of Marxism-Leninism use any part of Marxism except its essential one: the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a permanence of destruction of classes until the class society as a whole is out of existence. Mr. Vakar's book is a typical case of the familiar practice — used also by all pseudo-Marxists — which consists of stealing parts of Marxism and directing them against the principles of Marxism.

Throughout the years of the "cold war" a new kind of bureaucracy seems to have been formed in the United States: the Sovietology "bureaucracy." For years the ordinary members of this school have sung the old song: Russians are fanatic Marxists. This block-headed refusal to admit that pseudo-Marxism is a fact made Russia a sphinx that gave more than three puzzles to the bankrupt mind of the modern West. Meanwhile, a realistic view of the Russian government — excluding, of course, any essential differentiation of Marxism-Leninism from the Russian state — is indispensable to the "free world." The latest theory seems to catch both flies together. It combines the realistic view of Russian society, and, therefore, a tacit acknowledgment of the fact of pseudo-Marxism — with a manifest mythoplasm on Marxism being identical with peasant socialism.

Whatever is "realistic" (Mr. H. E. Salisbury puts it: "It is Mr. Vakar's genius" . . . to view Russians "as they really are") in this theory is based on an idea purloined — consciously or unconsciously — from the theoretical arsenal of Marxism-Leninism. The rest is pragmatic mythography.

There is of course "obective ground" for this myth. The reconstruction of the Russian state followed a revolution led by Marxist-Leninists. The same state continuously claims to be "Marxist-Leninist." Every school boy knows that much.

On the other hand, it is in the interests of the capitalist class, and other possessing classes, to eternalize the idea that Marxism-Leninism, i.e. proletarian communism, is identical with peasant National-Socialism, i.e., pseudo-communism — to see that this assumes the "fixity of popular prejudice."

Mr. Vakar's latest theory of the peasant "Soviet" society as a "practical result" of Marxist-Leninist "Utopia" tries to do the utmost in that direction.

In Marxism, as a rule, "theories" are judged not merely by what they say but by what they actually mean. And Mr. Vakar too means to say that "The Russian state of today is the result of the dictatorship of the proletariat." This is, as far as Marxist-Leninists are concerned what all the enemies of the working class are always out to prove and prove again.

In opposition to this, the Marxist-Leninist conception of the contemporary Russian state, as I consider it, views it as a result of the elimination and replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the dictatorship of the peasant class and of Marxism-Leninism by peasant National-Socialism in pseudo-Marxist disguise.

It is the phenomenon of pseudo-Marxism that should be understood and explained as a historically developed falsity. This can be done only by Marxism itself, the theory of the class struggle, class rule and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

M. Main
New York

Editor:

After having read some issues of your magazine, I noticed that it devotes almost no attention to the arts and when it does so, as in the review of the film *Judgment at Nuremberg,* there is a great deal of analysis of the background against which the film is set but no mention of the artistic technique, positive and negative, which presented the ideas to best advantage. The aforementioned review used the film as a mere pretext to elaborate on Germany. There was no attempt to analyze the strength or weakness of the presentation. I think your readers may be interested in films, foreign and domestic, which do not have the self-evident message of the film reviewed but which, nevertheless, are making important social comments on society. Since many films are not making such direct statements and have ideas which are more implicit than explicit, their method would have to be analyzed more closely . . . .

A.R.
Los Angeles, Calif.

Editor:

Have you noticed a recent spate of articles in various places on the general theme of the decline of the union movement? Among these, I have a pamphlet published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions of Santa Barbara, a section of the Fund for the Republic entitled "The Decline of the Labor Movement," by Solomon Barkin; an article from a recent issue of *Look* entitled "Is Labor on the Skids?" by Thomas B. Morgan and another from the Sept. 1 issue of *The Nation* called "Labor's Ebbing Strength" by George Kirsten. The latter is, as you have probably seen, Part I of which the second part is called "Leisure in an Automated World" by Georges Friedman, a translation from the French.

These articles and pamphlet certainly prove that labor's strength is indeed "ebbing," if it is not "on the skids." I think we are obliged to enter this discussion since none of the above authors give a fundamental analysis nor, of course, do they come up with a solution that will work.

Have you thought of something for the ISR on this theme? . . .

M.A.
Los Angeles, Calif.

Editor:

Guess it isn't possible to do away with the high-gloss paper for the Review. But it sure would be easier to read. This is the only thing I would like to have different about the Review. We don't want to miss one issue, so here is my renewal. Thanks for the fine job of analyzing. Let the truth shine forth, if possible, on not so shiny paper.

M.F.
Lloydminster, Alberta

Editor:

As per agreement, I am sending you the money for another year. Maybe I'll be reading it that long. I'm only 92 years old, so no telling, but here's hoping. I enjoy reading socialist literature; been a socialist since 1896. There are a lot more of us now, than there were at that time. The more the better. The idea will encompass the world's population eventually, but it is too slow for me to ever see that time. I hope to be looking for the Fall number.

W.S.
Vashon, Washington

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Can Wall Street Afford Peace?

by Art Preis

ON THE eve of the 17-nation disarmament conference convened last March 14 in Geneva, a large-scale propaganda campaign was launched to allay widespread fears in the capitalist world that any significant cut in military spending will lead to a severe economic crisis, particularly in the United States. Moscow, as well as Washington, joined in this historically unique campaign.

In this age of potential nuclear annihilation, it might seem that the exclusive concern would be whether the United States, as well as all other atomic powers, can afford **not** to disarm. But just before the Geneva conference opened, agencies of both the United States government and the United Nations released official reports and studies devoted to serious and extensive analyses of whether capitalist United States can afford — **economically** speaking — to disarm. Never before has disarmament been discussed as a possibly grave threat to U.S. economic stability in such an open and official manner.

"The new attempt that will be made in Geneva next week to negotiate a world-wide treaty for general and complete disarmament has again raised the question of whether the United States could afford to disarm," began Max Frankel in his special Washington dispatch to the March 5 *New York Times*. His lengthy article immediately makes clear that he's not discussing some military hazard which the U.S. cannot "afford" to risk. He explains:

"Since World War II, when huge military expenditures became an important element of the country's economy, the thought of eliminating these expenditures from the federal budget has raised fears of a major depression. The quick downward response of the stock market to 'peace scares' has been symbolic of a widespread suspicion that even if the country wished to disarm and felt safe enough to do so it could not agree to disarm without risking financial chaos."

Frankel's article is a report and analysis of a study made by a panel of American economists for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency set up last year by President John F. Kennedy. The panel is headed by Emil Benoit, associate professor of international business in the Graduate School of Business at Columbia University. He is also Director of the Program of Research on Economic Adjustments to Disarmament, financed by private foundations. Prof. Benoit's own formulations on the subject may be read in the chapter he contributed to *The Liberal Papers*, a symposium edited by James Roosevelt and published in April 1962 by Doubleday & Company, Inc.

On March 11, less than a week after Frankel's report on the Benoit panel study and three days before the Geneva parley opened, the United Nations made public its report by ten economics experts on "the national economic and social consequences of disarmament in countries with different economic systems and at different stages of economic development." The ten experts, who had been chosen by the late UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, came from countries as politically and economically divergent as the United States, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, Sudan and Venezuela, all with capitalist economies, and the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, all non-capitalist countries with nationalized economies.

WE MUST carefully note at the outset that the United Nations and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency studies both concede, either directly or by implication, that rapid and total disarmament by the Soviet Union can be achieved without any economic crisis or serious dislocation of economic activity. Moreover, these reports, as well as commentaries on them in the U.S. press, agree that disarmament would be immediately advantageous to the Soviet Union and the other non-capitalist countries.

The summary of the UN study published in the March 12 *New York Times*, disposes of the major economic problem posed by disarmament in the Soviet Union and other countries with nationalized, planned economies, in one paragraph:

"In the centrally planned economies, where productive capacity is usually fully utilized, it would be necessary to convert plants producing military equipment to production of durable consumer goods and of such investment goods as can be produced in them with only minor retooling. This can be done rapidly."

Almost four columns of condensed type are used in the *Times* summary of the UN report to explain how it might be possible for the highly industrialized capi-

talist countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, to avert economic decline and mass unemployment despite disarmament.

Both the U.S. and the UN studies emphasize disarmament as a serious economic problem only for the private-profit economies. We will examine more fully what the official reports have to say on this aspect of the problem further on in this article. First, let us see what they say about the economic consequences of disarmament for the Soviet Union.

In the very last paragraph of his analysis of the Benoit panel report, Max Frankel summarizes all it has to say on the effect of disarmament on the Soviet Union:

"Should disarmament come, the experts point out, the fate of the non-Communist world would depend more than ever upon the peaceful economic competition between East and West and the two worlds' capacities for aiding underdeveloped continents. If the United States were unprepared, they say, it could lose that long-range contest the day it achieves the long-elusive goal of freedom from war."

THE experts — this special panel of American economists headed by Columbia University's Professor Benoit — have trepidations about the "long-range" economic prospects of the United States compared to those of the Soviet Union once "freedom from war" is achieved.

On the basis of this same study, Frankel asserts that "the Russians . . . derive from their Marxist schooling a deeply held conviction that disarmament would quickly give them the lead in any peaceful economic race with the West."

But just two paragraphs before, Frankel admits that it's not the Russians at all who voice doubts about the economic viability of American capitalism in a disarmed world. The *Times* correspondent writes:

"However, although the Russians, for their own political reasons, now agree that the capitalist system could withstand the shock of disarming, a great many persons both here and abroad have their doubts."

The subversive talk about the economic hazards of peace for U.S. capitalism is not being spread by the Russians after all, but by anonymous "great many persons both here and abroad." The great many persons "here," at least, are identified in part by Frankel when he notes the "quick downward response of the stock market to 'peace scares' . . ."

Another *New York Times* analyst, C. L. Sulzberger, reporting from Geneva in the March 17 issue, also repeats ritualistically the formula: "Moscow is convinced the United States cannot afford to disarm because this would wreck our capitalist economy." But then he goes on immediately to cite a more compelling reason why the Russians are most anxious for disarmament:

"Washington suspects Russia is almost forced to end the present arms race because it needs to tap the reservoir of military manpower to aid its faltering agriculture."

Sulzberger elaborates this point and also indicates an economic motivation for the capitalist leaders to drag their feet on the disarmament issue. He writes:

"No doubt disarmament on any major scale would convenience the Soviet economy. It would provide more men to expand food production, Russia's Achilles heel. It would afford new capital for investment in consumer goods and political exports to under-developed countries.

"Conversely, massive disarmament might for a time worry the U.S. economy at an awkward moment. We are in the throes of adjusting ourselves to competition with the dynamic European Common Market and we have not yet solved the gold leakage. During the last dozen years our bullion holdings dropped by $7.5 billion."

To Sulzberger's inventory of international economic tribulations comprising an "awkward moment" for U.S.

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disarmament, he would have been able to add two months later the worst stock market crash since 1929 plus signs of an approaching recession marked by industrial overcapacity, persistent mass unemployment and slackening capital investment.

But, Sulzberger nevertheless assures us, "Our immense armaments effort could be shifted with surprising ease and ultimate convenience to new, non-military endeavors . . ."

Since "disarmament on any major scale would convenience the Soviet economy" and also provide "ultimate convenience to new, non-military endeavors" in this country, what prevents our achieving that "diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use" which, the UN study says, "could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions"?

NONE of these studies, reports and commentaries offers a rational explanation of why the Soviet Union would want to obstruct disarmament. Indeed, they all concede or at least imply that the Soviet Union and its leaders yearn for disarmament and visualize enormous economic benefits from it.

Benoit, furthermore, on page 236 of *The Liberal Papers,* ascribes to "Marxian fantasies" the belief that a capitalist economy requires military expenditures to "keep going." Sulzberger, as cited above, claims that "Moscow is convinced the United States cannot afford to disarm because this would wreck our capitalist economy." Isn't this all the more reason why the Soviet Union would earnestly and urgently desire immediate, full and unconditional disarmament?

But the alleged belief of the Soviet leaders that disarmament would wreck the capitalist economy is not really involved. U.S. capitalism could quickly disprove such a belief by a disarmament agreement and a shift "with surprising ease" to "new, non-military endeavors," if Sulzberger is correct.

There is some evidence, however, that U.S. strategists are weighing the competitive advantage, in the economic sense, enjoyed by the United States over the Soviet Union in a continuation and intensification of the arms race. This line of thought is reflected in "Military Defense: Free World Strategy in the 60s," by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé and Dr. William Kintner, political science professors at the University of Pennsylvania, director and deputy director respectively of the Foreign Policy Research Institute with close ties in the Pentagon. Their joint article, published in the January-March 1962 issue of *General Electric Forum,* says:

"Contrary to general belief, the [arms] race need not work against world stability and peace. It could serve as the most effective means to bring the Communist rulers to reasonable terms. *For the Free World can better afford such a competition than the Communist bloc.*" (Original emphasis.)

THIS, of course, is only the opposite side of the coin tossed by Sulzberger when he states that Washington "suspects" the Soviet leaders want to end the arms race because it "would convenience the Soviet economy" by providing "more men to expand food production" and "new capital" for investment to produce more consumer goods and for exports to the poorer lands.

The Strausz-Hupé-Kintner thesis, however, does not answer the question whether capitalist United States can substantially reduce its military establishment and expenditures without grave consequences for the economy. It simply argues that forcing the Soviet Union into an arms race would put an intolerable economic squeeze on the USSR's non-capitalist, planned economy. This argument does carry the implication that armaments spending is economically more supportable and more advantageous for the private profit economy than for the nationalized economy.

In its own way, therefore, this line affirms what is stated or implied in both the UN and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency studies: There is every economic and material reason for the *Soviet Union* to desire and seek speedy and total disarmament.

The whole issue of disarmament narrows down to the economic consequences of disarmament—of a non-militaristic program—for the United States. In other words, can Wall Street, the symbol of U.S. finance monopoly capitalism, afford peace?

It must be clearly understood that no real Marxist (Stalinists or Khrushchevites are excluded from this category) has ever contended that a capitalist economy can be kept going only by armaments spending. That is a crude and vulgar distortion of Marxism by the Benoits and Sulzbergers. The basic Marxist analysis of modern capitalism and war was made in the spring of 1916 in a pamphlet, *Imperialism — The Highest Stage of Capitalism.* It was written by Lenin who less than two years later, with his co-worker Leon Trotsky, was to lead the first successful socialist revolution.

Lenin pointed out, with supporting statistical data, that World War I was being fought between competing gangs of monopoly capitalists for the redivision of the world, all of whose important areas had been gobbled up by 1914 and turned into colonies or "spheres of influence" by the largest and the richest capitalist powers. He called this the "imperialist" stage of capitalism, which he defined as follows:

"Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been completed."

Lenin pointed out that great financial oligarchies, able to dispose of immense concentrations of finance capital, were fighting for international control of markets, sources of raw materials and, above all, spheres for the profitable investment of rapidly accumulating capital lying idle at home.

Lenin subsequently described the whole epoch of the ascendancy of finance capital as the period of imperialist wars, colonial uprisings and proletarian rev-

olutions. This historical record since 1914 gives overwhelming verification to this succinct formulation of the explosive character of the most advanced stage of capitalism. Within the brief historic span of less than half a century, living mankind has experienced two world wars among the dominant capitalist powers, including the United States; a series of successful colonial uprisings in Asia, Africa and Latin America which have wrested huge chunks of the globe from the direct rule of the capitalist imperialist powers or their indirect rule through economic domination; and several proletarian revolutions which have destroyed the capitalist state structures in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, East Germany, Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam and now, for the first time in the Western Hemisphere, in Cuba.

THESE shattering events have had their roots in the observable and measurable laws of development of world capitalism. These laws have manifested themselves in intolerable economic contradictions. The foremost of these has been the tendency of the productive forces to outstrip the available markets, resulting in what has been called "overproduction" or the production of unmarketable surpluses of commodities and the accumulation of capital at a faster rate than can be profitably invested.

Capitalism has no peaceful, non-violent, socially beneficial way of resolving this basic contradiction because it has an automatic, built-in limitation: it may not overstep the profit interests of the dominant finance capitalists. Therefore, capitalism must seek to resolve the contradiction of the "overproduction" of commodities and capital by periodic destruction or liquidation of the "surpluses." The stronger capitalists seek to achieve a new level of economic stability — that is, an increase in the rate of profits — by wiping out the weaker competing capitalists and obtaining a monopoly of both the productive forces and the markets. This is attempted in both depressions and wars.

The world-wide capitalist depression of the Thirties, however, proved incapable of solution through purely economic measures and maneuvers, even with the massive intervention of the capitalist state. The elimination of "surplus" capital and commodities by liquidation through bankruptcies and failures, plus the direct use of government power to create scarcity through physical curtailment of production, such as the slaughter of live stock and the plowing under of a fixed percentage of crops, momentarily caused a revival of the capitalist economy in the middle Thirties. But by the end of the decade a new decline had set in.

The attempt in the United States, for instance, to restore the economy primarily through internal measures proved unsuccessful. By 1938, in fact, unemployment had again passed the 10 million mark and industrial production had fallen in one year by 25 per cent. More and more, *all* the major capitalist powers turned toward external measures, seeking economic rehabilitation at the expense of international competitors and rivals.

The world war that ensued solved nothing. Momentarily, the United States emerged from the war economically dominant and able to dictate terms to its imperialist rivals. At the same time it had to rehabilitate them and together with its former enemies it sought to prepare for a military accounting with its wartime ally, the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the war had shaken loose revolutionary forces all over the world — India, China, Korea, Indo-China, Indonesia, North Africa, East Europe, Cuba. The whole colonial and semi-colonial world, comprising four-fifths of the world's population and two-thirds of its land mass, was smashing the imperialist yoke. A large sector broke away from the capitalist economy toward nationalized economy; another sector — and a growing one — has sought to limit its economic and political dependency on the capitalist powers.

IT IS within this larger world historic framework that the question of the economic role of armaments in the United States must be viewed. The armaments program was not designed as an internal economic measure to bolster the economy. It was and is intended ultimately to resolve the intolerable contradictions of monopoly capitalism through the obliteration of the non-capitalist third of the earth and through the subjection of the rest of the world to the profit interests of U.S. finance capital.

We can arrive at a correct answer to the question posed at the start — "Can American capitalism afford to disarm?" — only within this larger and more decisive context. We must understand that the military program, initiated and intended for conquest, is the consequence of impelling forces in the very structure of capitalism.

Let us now turn to our delayed examination of what the UN and U.S. economics experts have to say about the effect of disarmament on the United States economy.

To begin with, neither group is talking about rapid and total disarmament. At best, they are discussing the economic consequences of a gradual slackening of the arms race. The UN study is much more vague on this — as well as several other points — than the study made for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The UN report, without setting any specific time limit or degree of disarmament, simply notes that "hypothetical studies," based on the "assumption" that military expenditures will be replaced "wholly" by increased government expenditures for non-military purposes, "suggest" that "some 6 or 7 per cent (including the armed forces) of the total labor force in the United States . . . would have to find civilian instead of military employment or change their employment from one industry to another.

"These shifts would be small if spread out over a number of years . . . The higher the rate of the growth of the economy, the easier the adaptation."

This estimate leaves out two things: 1) the number of unemployed in this country in June was already 4,463,000, or 5.5 per cent of the civilian labor force,

so that the total of those for whom jobs would have to be supplied would be more than ten million in the event of "rapid disarmament"; 2) the rate of growth of the economy would have to be faster than at any time since World War II, even to keep the number of unemployed from rising above the 10 million level, according to estimates of almost all U.S. economists.

But we will leave these matters aside — for the moment. What is meant by the UN report's phrase, "a number of years" for the shift to disarmament? The Benoit panel report tells us more explicity. As described by Max Frankel in his *New York Times* analysis, one of the major points of the Benoit report is:

"Assuming that disarmament will be accomplished in stages over ten to twelve years, and that it will be accompanied by greater outlays for international inspection and police forces, as well as civilian space and nuclear energy programs, it is unlikely to result in immediate depression of the United States economy."

We will ignore the qualifying "immediate" before the word "depression" — for the time being. Certainly, no "immediate" is placed before the word "disarmament." It is to take "ten to twelve years." But wait, the panel is not speaking of ten to twelve years from **now.** Further on, Frankel explains:

"For the convenience of planning, therefore, it is assumed that disarmament is not likely to begin before 1965 and that at best it would take effect in four periods of three years, and be completed about 1977."

In short, disarmament is envisaged "at best" within 15 years. But pause some more.

THE Benoit report doesn't really base itself on "total" disarmament. As a matter of fact, it expects armaments spending to rise to $60 billion in 1965 with "more than 7,000,000 persons employed in civilian or Government defense work." Then it will start to taper off. One thing the study is sure of: arms spending is going to grow bigger before it grows smaller.

When it starts to grow smaller, just how much smaller will it grow? Well, by 1969 it will be down to a mere $43 billion a year — about what it was just before Kennedy took office, or the highest in U.S. peacetime history up to 1961. By 1972, ten years from now, the reduction would be to $31 billion annually. By 1977, "defense spending by the Government is expected to drop from about $60,000,000,000 to $28,000,000,000." In other words, war spending will continue to be at a pace more than double the average annual military spending from 1946 through 1950, which in turn was thirteen times greater than in pre-war 1939. From now, until 1977, 15 years hence, the U.S. will have "disarmed" to a total of about $600 billion of **additional** military spending.

Since we have had two major — that is, **world** — wars within the past half century, it is natural to seek in historical experience some guide to the problem of disarmament as faced by the great capitalist powers, particularly the United States where the military expenditures comprise about 45 per cent of the world's total arms spending and four times that of the Soviet Union.

Curiously, neither the UN nor the U.S. Arms Control Agency study investigates the economic experience following World War I. In the United States, at least, the decade following World War I was known as the "Golden Twenties." The index of industrial production (1957=100) rose from 26 in 1920 to 38 in 1929, a 46 per cent growth. It is true that an economic decline in 1921 reduced the industrial production index to 20, down 23 per cent from the year before. But by 1923, the index stood at 30, rising almost steadily with no serious reversal until 1930. This was accomplished with an almost continuous decline in both federal spending and federal debt. Total federal spending dropped more than half between 1920 and 1925, from $6.4 billion annually to $3.06 billion, while military spending fell from $4.6 billion to $600 million. The federal debt fell from a 1919 post-war high of $25.5 billion to $16.9 billion in 1929. In short, in that period the U.S. economy was able to advance despite a sharp **decline** in federal spending and with a drastic slash in military expenditures.

But both the UN and U.S. agency reports quite correctly see no precedent in the post-World War I experience and do not bother to mention it. For by 1929, even the United States, banker to the world, could not maintain a stable and advancing economy strictly through "free enterprise." As a matter of fact, even massive federal spending and ten straight years of federal budget deficits could not restore the U.S. economy to the 1929 level. The job was done by war spending, piling up the federal debt from $45.9 billion in 1939 to $269.9 billion in 1946.

WHAT happened at the end of World War II is examined by both reports to see if it contains some guide for disarmament today. Here we find a wide difference of opinion.

The UN report emphasizes: "The post-war conversion was a much larger one and involved a more rapid transfer of resources than total disarmament would require today. Nevertheless, huge armies were quickly demobilized without a significant rise in unemployment in most countries." Only as a quite casual afterthought, does the UN study add: "During the post-war conversion, however, the major concern of economic policy was to restrain, rather than maintain, over-all demand."

The Benoit panel report, as described by Max Frankel, dismisses as totally inapplicable to the present situation the post-World War II experience.

"Demobilizations after World War II and the Korean War are not comparable, the experts maintain, because consumer saving and demand has not been pent up, as it was then. The employment problem now, they note, is much more serious than it was after Korea with both the labor force and the productivity of each worker growing rapidly in the Nineteen Sixties."

One simple fact, which neither report mentions, underscores the difference between disarming today and after World War II. During World War II it was necessary to drastically limit and curtail civilian produc-

tion to provide enough labor, plants and resources for war production. Today, with military spending within a billion dollars of the Korean War peak in 1953, we are having the beginnings of an economic crisis of **overproduction** in **civilian** commodities and uninvested **private capital.**

What is the weight of militarism in the U.S. economy today? An extensive review of "the pattern of defense spending" in the Sunday Business Section of the April 29 *New York Times,* begins: "There's no business like big business and the biggest of all is defense business . . . the biggest single economic activity, not only in the United States but in the world."

In the United States, according to Frankel's review of the Benoit panel study, the military business involves "nearly one in ten of every dollar produced in goods and services . . . nearly one in ten of all workers . . . 86 per cent of all federal government purchases of goods and services . . . 95 per cent of all jobs in the aircraft and missile industries, 60 per cent of jobs in ship and boat-loading industries and 40 per cent of the jobs in radio and communications equipment manufacturing."

Now keep in mind that the "defense business" has not replaced normal civilian production but has been incorporated into the regular economic machinery as the "biggest of all" the big businesses. How can this be eliminated, or even reduced about 50 per cent, as the Benoit study really envisages "disarmament," without a serious economic convulsion?

It can be done, say the various official reports from the UN and U.S. agencies, with a couple of mammoth-sized "ifs." If "total effective demand can be maintained" (UN study). If "military expenditures were fully replaced by public and private non-military spending . . ." (UN study). If the government "could strike the proper balance between immediate tax reductions to spur civilian demands, and increased Government spending on longer-range needs . . . school construction, teacher training, roads, urban renewal, area redevelopment, public health and social services." (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency study).

Unfortunately, Frankel observes in his summary of the Benoit panel report, "the experts also note that under present laws, without vigorous Government action of the kind the country has never before been required to take, a drop of $5,000,000,000 in defense spending could cause a serious slowdown."

But that wouldn't be the half of it, Frankel indicated back last March 5, if another development took place:

"Pessimism and a break in the stock market, the experts say, might make matters very bad."

Matters **have** become "very bad," because the worst break in the stock market since 1929 occurred in May and June, little more than two months after Frankel's report.

The Benoit panel concluded, "education, welfare and public works projects are the most attractive aspects of disarmament." But, these same experts concede, "it remains a problem how these can be achieved in a way that will maintain and spur economic growth in the absence of defense spending.

"Students of the economics of disarmament have begun to explore these areas," we are informed. "But they are not certain that a tradition-oriented Congress would accept such Government activity in time."

A Congress which would vote down a Medicare bill to provide a little medical assistance to aged sick through funds levied by a payroll tax is certainly going to need a lot of persuading to vote for thirty or forty billions of federal spending for socially beneficial purposes to replace the decline in arms spending some fifteen years from now.

IT IS in the light of such political considerations, if nothing else, that we must evaluate the Kremlin's line on disarmament as expressed by Professor Oskar Lange once Poland's representative in the UN Security Council, in the April 16 issue of a leading Moscow newspaper, *Izvestia.* Lange wrote that in many capitalist countries "there are fears that disarmament would provoke mass unemployment and economic crisis" and that "reactionary imperialist circles as well as the monopolies that have profited from military contracts make use of these fears in their struggle against disarmament." But, Lange assures the ruling U.S. Monopoly capitalists, "this does not mean that it would be impossible to bring about disarmament in the capitalist countries without economic shocks. Such shocks could be avoided by application of certain measures of economic policy directed toward the replacement of military contracts by orders connected with peaceful aims . . ."

Let us assume that the reactionary U.S. Congress, the political agency of the monopolists who benefit from military contracts, agrees to disarmament and a titanic increase in social and welfare spending. Let us assume that the private real estate interests are unable to block new low-rent housing, that the giant industrial corporations permit the government to invade the fields of industrial production, that the Church hierarchs and the Southern segregationists cease to obstruct federal spending for public education. Let us assume all this and a great deal more and we still have not answered the question about armaments and the economy. Can Wall Street afford to disarm? But this is not really the decisive question. In fact, it's the wrong question.

The question that must be answered is this: if more than a trillion dollars of military spending since 1946, if the accumulation of a $300 billion federal debt now maturing at a dizzying rate of nearly $100 billion a year, if the withholding of millions of youth from the labor force by their sequestration in the armed forces — if all these have failed to stabilize the U.S. capitalist economy, how will the same amount or less of federal spending for peaceful purposes in place of militarism fundamentally solve the basic contradictions of capitalism? If the monstrous armaments spending won't do the trick, how will welfare spending?

This contradiction can be resolved in just one way, as Socialist Workers Party Chairman James P. Cannon once put it, by "one small, but good, social revolution" to replace capitalist anarchy with socialist planning.

In Defense of Dialectics

Do Marxists suffer from an "Hegelian metaphysical jag"? Some feel that Dialectical Materialism has been rendered obsolete by the new discoveries of the physical sciences

By Arne Swabeck

DOES the Marxist philosophy, or more particularly, does the method of dialectical materialism have any validity as a philosophy of science? This question, since it was first propounded affirmatively by Marx and Engles, has frequently been debated by serious students of theoretical thought. It is not surprising that *Studies on the Left* should carry an echo of these debates.

However, the contribution by Gerald Dworkin entitled, "Dialectics: A Philosophical Analysis," is a rather crude echo. Apparently the author has gained a great deal of knowledge, both useful and useless, without the aid of the dialectic, and feels entitled to his assumed superiority. In fact, he not only attempts to detract from and deprecate the subject matter, but he concludes his essay on dialectics on a distinctly derisive note. His concluding paragraph deserves to be quoted in full:

"It was said of Spinoza that his God was a hangover from an earlier religious jag. I suspect that for the Marxist much of dialectics is a hangover from an earlier Hegelian metaphysical jag. The sooner he sobers up, the sooner he will be able to work more fruitfully on the difficult and crucial problems of our time."

Some of these difficult and crucial problems come readily to mind. There is the threat of nuclear war, the continued and varied manifestations of world crisis, and the deprivation and hunger in large areas of the world. On home grounds we have such problems as civil rights, civil liberties, unemployment and capitalist exploitation. But the question arises: if sobering up from a hangover of an earlier Hegelian metaphysical jag enables more fruitful work on these problems, why are not the many leading lights of the bourgeois world, its academic circles, its economic, social and political areas, or its agents in labor's ranks — why are not these able to do so? They do not suffer from such a hangover. They have never been attracted to or seduced by the dialectic because they view it as an abomination. Yet, any attempt to measure the fruitfulness of their work on these difficult and crucial problems would most likely turn up zero.

This article is a reply to an attempted refutation of dialectical materialism by Gerald Dworkin, appearing in *Studies on the Left,* Vol. 2, No. 1, 1961. The editors published only a part of the reply; the last section dealing with social developments being entirely omitted. We think the student of Marxism would be interested to read the whole reply by Arne Swabeck published in this issue.

It is my contention that fruitful work in these areas requires as a first prerequisite the application of the dialectical method of thought. But before entering into this aspect of the debate, let us consider the questions posed by Dworkin: Are the laws of dialectics the most general laws of motion and development and do they provide a useful methodology? He answers both questions negatively. I shall try to defend the affirmative position.

In contemporary physical sciences the comprehension of the world not as a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, of changes and transformations, finds increasing acceptance. Hardly anything is regarded as given or fixed. Moreover, implicitly, if not explicitly, the great progress made in this field has been materialist in nature. To get a clearer picture of this development we need only recount some of the important discoveries. While contributing to the theory of knowledge they also splendidly illustrate the dialectical laws of natural events.

Let us start with Becquerel's discovery of the radioactivity of natural elements. It occurred at the turn of the century. Through further research by Pierre and Marie Curie it was learned that atoms of the heavier elements were breaking up, or decomposing spontaneously, expelling with incredible speeds particles and radiation, or rays, of such intensity that they penetrate thick metals and destroy living tissues. In the process atoms of these elements are converted to atoms of other elements.

Later it became possible to explain this phenomenon in terms of nuclear forces. In the very heavy atoms where many protons and neutrons are packed within the nuclei, the forces that hold the nuclei together are inadequate and the atoms are unstable. These atoms were breaking up physically in a shower of bullet-like particles and destructive radiation. And it was the great energy of the expelled particles and rays that brought forth the realization of the tremendous source of energy that is locked within the atomic nucleus.

Thus, in the flash of radioactivity these elements were shown to be anything but immutable. They pass through a transmutation and release energy in the process. The qualitatively different characteristics of the natural elements are determined by the quantity of their atomic weight. However, with the alteration of the proportion of particles in the atomic nucleus, the character of the element is changed. Quantitative change in the discharge of particles produces a qualitative difference. Spontaneous

radioactivity thus revealed these simple dialectic laws of nature at the very foundation of matter.

Here we have a concrete example of the fact that our dialectic thinking grows directly out of the dialectics of nature, and having its roots in objective reality, the dialectic method is thoroughly materialistic in character.

FURTHER objective evidence of the dialectic laws of nature has been accumulated through more recent discoveries. Particularly striking are the data gained through artificially induced nuclear fission and the resulting chain reaction. Listen to the report made by a scientist prominently associated in this venture, H. D. Smyth. In substance he stated the following:

There are two principles that have been the cornerstones of the structure of modern science. The first — that matter can be neither created nor destroyed but only altered in form (the law of the conservation of matter). The second — that energy can be neither created nor destroyed but only altered in form (the law of the conservation of energy).

"These two principles," says Dr. Smyth, "have constantly guided and disciplined the development and application of science. For all practical purposes they are still so, but it is now known that they are, in fact, two phases of a single principle for we have discovered that energy may sometimes be converted into matter and matter into energy. Specifically, such a conversion is observed in the phenomenon of nuclear fission of uranium, a process in which atomic nuclei split into fragments with the release of an enormous amount of energy." (*Atomic Energy for Military Purposes,* p. 1.)

In this discovery, the dialectic celebrates a great triumph. Matter is affirmed as existing only in motion as the dialectical materialists have always maintained. There is no motion without matter. (Motion as applied to matter is not the mere change of place; it is to be understood in its widest sense of changes and transformations, quantitative and qualitative, etc.) Matter and energy are interconnected and both are interchangeable. Matter is affirmed to be itself and at the same time something else; it is not simply identical with itself as demanded by formal logic. Energy has mass and mass represents energy; they are interchangeable and both exist within the one identity. Mass and energy are different, yet they are the same. That they are different is only half the truth; that they are simultaneously the same is the whole truth.

By nuclear fission a quantitative change produces a qualitative difference. A part of the nuclear mass is converted into nuclear energy. Moreover, the neutron released as the effect of one nuclear fission becomes the cause of other fissions, and in the chain reaction cause and effect continue to change place merging and dissolving in action and interaction. Which nucleus a neutron hits is accidental, but its action lies in the necessity of the thing itself, the necessity of its motion. The accidental and the necessary, while opposites, interpenetrate and supplement one another.

It is now a well known fact that uranium #235 is fissionable; but it is very scarce, whereas uranium #238, which is more abundant, is nonfissionable. In the atomic pile uranium #238 is subjected to bombardment by neutrons, which penetrate the nuclei, remain within them and produce a transformation from uranium to plutonium. In this process the addition of quantity — the neutron — produces a new quality: the conversion of one element into another, from nonfissionable uranium to fissionable plutonium. Man produces the dialectical transformation.

WHETHER we observe nature's own process of transmutation of the elements of radioactive matter, or the man-made transmutation by the controlled chain reaction of the atomic pile, the dialectic laws of motion and change are illustrated with compelling force.

The quantitative content of the process passes into a qualitative content. In both instances, not only is part of the nuclear mass converted into nuclear energy, but the atoms affected are converted into atoms of other elements.

The greatest contributions to a theoretical understanding of the relation between matter and energy, and their reciprocal interaction, were made by Einstein in his special theory of relativity and in the quantum theory by Max Planck. Einstein's views caused a revolutionary upheaval in scientific thought. The theory of relativity overturned the concepts of classical physics, but only to re-embody them in a new synthesis at a higher level of scientific knowledge. In the words of Einstein and Infeld: "The new theory shows the merits as well as the limitations of the old theory and allows us to regain our concepts from a higher level." (*Evolution of Physics,* p. 158.)

This confirms the Marxist contention that scientific knowledge unfolds in its successive stages, not in a mechanical but in a dialectical manner. Facts, observations, ideas, arise in opposition to prevailing views and generate seemingly insoluble contradictions. These contradictions become the motive force of scientific progress, of energetic thinking, study and research. They are finally resolved by a synthetic theory which makes room for the positive reality of both sides of the contradiction but eliminates the one-sided form in which they first appear.

The quantum theory marked a distinct departure from classical mechanics. Where continuity had previously reigned supreme, the quantum theory introduced the concept of discontinuity. Not only the energy of radiation but matter and electricity are viewed as having a granular structure. Electrons, the elementary particles of matter, were henceforth to be regarded as elementary quanta of negative electricity.

Einstein indicated a wider scope for the quantum theory in its application to the phenomena of light. This he based on the assumption that homogeneous light is composed of energy grains, or light quanta called photons. The assumption found support in the observational evidence that a beam of light bends in a gravitational field. A beam of light carries energy and energy has mass which is attracted by the gravitational field. But the wave theory of light had been previously established; the different wave lengths had been measured. So here we had, declared Einstein and Infeld, "two contradictory pictures of reality; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do!" (*The Evolution of Physics,* p. 278.)

Why these contradictory pictures of reality should, in the words of Dworkin, cause "more confusion" or lead to "despair or irrationalism" is somewhat of a mystery. Tacitly, if not formally, the Einstein-Infeld statement supports the dialectical interpretation of natural phenomena. It is the contradictory aspects of reality, everywhere and in everything, that constitute its fundamental feature.

CONCERNING continuity or discontinuity, either concept by itself alone is, of course, one-sided. In reality both exist simultaneously. Rather, continuity and discontinuity should be viewed as an interacting process. Nature, in its general and multiform manifestations, is both continuous and discontinuous. Can we not say that this is particularly the case with the phenomena of light, i.e., the light that we receive from the sun and the stars? Aside from the contradictory pictures of waves and particles, we should note the existence simultaneously of continuity and discontinuity. These opposites interpenetrate one another.

From the standpoint of the wave theory, light must be said to be quantitatively continuous. A beam of light consists of a continuous flow of waves in space. Light is qualitatively discontinuous, however, since it exists in a variety of qualitatively different wavelength forms composing the spectrum.

From the standpoint of the quantum theory, light must be said to be quantitatively discontinuous. Light is emitted

in the form of a stream of discrete units of quanta (photons). On the other hand, light is now qualitatively continuous, since the photons all consist of the same form of radiant energy.

The separation and opposition of continuity and discontinuity exist only within their unity and interconnection. All that moves is contradictory, and this arises out of the contradictory nature of reality itself. In this the contradiction is not the end of the matter but, as Hegel insisted, it cancels itself.

"Motion itself is a contradiction," says Engels, "even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time, being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place, and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." (*Anti-Dühring,* International Publishers, p. 132.)

But Dworkin denies that contradictions have any relation to reality. He states categorically: "It is nonsense then to say that contradictions exist in the world. Contradictions are properties of statements, not objects." By a strange coincidence — or perhaps it is not so strange — this statement corresponds almost word for word with the position of Herr Dühring, against whom Engels polemicized. Said Herr Dühring: "Contradiction is a category which can only appertain to a combination of thoughts, but not to reality. There are no contradictions in things, or, to put it another way, contradiction applied to reality is itself the apex of absurdity." (Quoted by Engels in *Anti-Dühring,* p. 131.)

Having thus unwittingly aligned himself with some of Herr Dühring's notions, it is not too surprising that Dworkin attacks the observation made by Engels: "Life is also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which continually asserts and solves itself." Surely this, says Dworkin, "is anthropomorphism run wild." How so? What Engels clearly defines as the contradiction of organic life is the continual cycle of accretion and destruction. He shows that the simultaneous building-up of cells on the one hand and their decay on the other, constitute the basis, the condition, for the process of life. Organic life is properly pictured in its dynamic state, as a self-completing process of constant chemical reaction, according to which the existence of a delicate balance between breakdown and synthesis is precisely what life is. Most certainly contradictions are objectively present in the world and when contradiction ceases life itself comes to an end. What these observations have to do with anthropomorphism still remains to be explained.

Dworkin laments what he calls the lack of definition of the term *opposite,* and how opposites are related. Again, one may ask, how so? Consider the example just mentioned above. We have in that a clear definition of opposites, the building-up and the breaking-down. Dialectically, these opposites are so closely interconnected that the one cannot exist without the other. Not only do they not exclude one another, but in their interpenetration they mutually condition each other.

TURNING from motion and development in nature to the social arena, we find that contradictions become even more pronounced. Outstanding is the example of the class struggle in society. It has been the connecting link in successive stages of civilization; now it reflects primarily the contradiction between socialized production and capitalist appropriation. But even aside from this aspect, capitalism is not a stable system. Although its development is determined by objective laws, contradictory tendencies are deeply embedded in its foundation and these become part of the objective laws. From a fairly early stage, elements of growth and expansion unfolded side by side with elements of crisis and decline. These tendencies interpenetrate one another and are in constant interaction. Because of this a sustained equilibrium and smooth vectors of movement are not possible. Capitalist production begets a vicious circle. Economic cycles alternate between boom and crisis; a glutted market leads to depression, an economic upturn creates new glut which again plunges the economy into depression.

During the early stages of capitalist development elements of growth and expansion predominated over those of crisis and decline. But they did not prove enduring. A whole set of explosive changes acted to turn the early progressive features into their opposite. Elements of crisis, of decline and decay, came more to the fore and became predominant.

Let us consider next the question posed by Dworkin: if the laws of dialectics are actually the most general laws of motion, "we should expect to find physicists, chemists, biologists and sociologists making use of them every day. The fact that they do not can hardly be attributed to class bias." Of that I am not so sure. Some scientists do make use of these laws, but their numbers are few. Some scientists even do so unconsciously. Why the overwhelming majority do not, I still believe to have been anticipated by Marx when he wrote in his preface to the second edition of *Capital*:

"In the mystical form (the Hegelian form—A.S.) dialectic became the fashion in Germany because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary." (*Capital,* Kerr edition, Vol. I, pp. 25, 26.)

What Dworkin calls the last law of the dialectic seems to arouse his greatest indignation. Incidentally, this leads him also the farthest astray. "The last law," he reveals, "inspired by the famous triad of Hegel — thesis, antithesis, synthesis — is in my opinion the most obscure, useless and mystical of them all." Referring to the application by Marx of this law of the dialectic to the course of capitalist development, Dworkin declares: "It is the characteristic of always finding the exemplification of dialectics in events after they have been explained by other methods that casts grave doubts upon the whole procedure."

Let us see what Marx's position was — according to Marx, not Dworkin: "The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property as founded on the labor of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production." (*Ibid,* p. 837.)

By the logical method of treatment (the logic of the dialectic) Marx at this point analysed the transition from feudalism to the capitalist mode of production, which negated the individual private ownership by the workers of their means of labor. The deductions made, he verified by the facts of history. From this analysis Marx drew the conclusion that "capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation." This is not at all, as Dworkin tries to make us believe, "always finding the exemplification of dialectics in events after they have been explained by other methods." Quite the contrary. By means of the dialectical method Marx was able to predict from his analysis — I repeat predict — the negation of the negation, the expropriation of the expropriators, the transformation of society. Without doubt, this

was the most monumental and the most far-reaching prediction ever recorded in human history.

In terms of exceptional clarity, Marx and his collaborator, Engels, explained the evolution of human society. Every historical period, they maintained, develops its own contradictions. Whenever one order of things becomes dominant within one particular stage, it has already given birth to a new tendency, an opposite tendency.

Thus, for example, in Europe during the Middle Ages small-scale production was general, and existed on the basis of the private ownership by the producers of their means of labor. But the great maritime discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries stimulated world-wide commerce and the steady growth of a market for manufactured goods, which could not be satisfied by the dwarfish, scattered, limited and individual means of production. This contradiction had to be resolved, and it was resolved through the transition from handicraft to manufacture and to large-scale industry. The new productive forces thus set in motion became incompatible with feudal forms of organization, and these were therefore annihilated. Individualized, scattered means of production were transformed into socially concentrated ones. The pigmy property of the many became the huge property of the few. The great mass of the people were divorced from their means of subsistence and from their means of labor. Capitalist private property, which rests on the exploitation of the nominally free labor of others, negated individual private ownership by the individual producers of their tools and instruments of labor.

Out of this development a new system of society, qualitatively different from its predecessor, arose — the natural effect of an accumulation of quantitative changes in the old society. The contradictions that arose became the crucial factors around which centered the transformation of the whole entity to the next stage. Thus the historical process and its contradictions were enabled to develope dialectically.

UNDER capitalism, Marx and Engels explained, large-scale industry develops not only the material forces of production, but also the antagonisms and conflicts between the classes born of it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor collide with capitalist appropriation. The increasing proletarianization of the mass of the people is matched by an ever greater mass of unsaleable goods. Overproduction with unemployment and want existing simultaneously — this is the absurd contradiction which makes the liberation of the productive forces by means of the socialist transformation an imperative necessity. And the development of the productive forces at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. "This integument is brust asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." This is how Marx foresaw the negation of the negation.

Entirely aware that the crucial problem was not merely to interpret the world, but to change it, both Marx and Engels saw in the development of the productive forces the material conditions for the solution of the contradictions of capitalist society, and the means by which this solution becomes possible. The laws of social development, which they had discovered, created the opportunity for effective and consciously directed social action.

And so it turned out to be in 1917. The Russian Revolution took the first step toward the socialist transformation of society. The expropriators were expropriated. This signalled the beginning of the transition to a qualitatively new historical stage. The limitations of the capitalist mode of production and its contradictory relations found their solution in a higher mode of production founded on nationalized property and state planning in the Soviet system of social relations. Revolutions in China and Cuba have since followed the same example.

A Confirmation

"The well established view today is rather that everything — anything at all — is at the same time particle and field. Everything has the continuous structure with which we are familiar from the field, as well as the discrete structure with which we are equally familiar from particles . . . The difficulty, in all cases equally great, of combining these two so very different character traits in one mental picture is still the main stumbling-block which causes our conception of matter to be so wavering and uncertain." — Erwin Schroedinger, What Is Life?

"Closer investigation also shows us that the two poles of an antithesis, like positive and negative, are just as inseparable from each other as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition they mutually penetrate each other." — Friedrich Engels, Anti-Duhring.

In the Russian revolution the Bolshevik party was victorious primarily owing to the comprehension and application by its leadership of the method of dialectical materialism. Conversely, by this victory the concepts of Marxism were brilliantly confirmed. But the Bolshevik party itself arose out of the contradictions that had beset the working class movement. This party, in fact, became the positive and the conscious affirmation of what Dworkin concedes to be the triad of Hegel; the party's existence and its revolutionary position exemplified the negation of the negation in working class political development.

Initially the socialist movement had been inspired by the revolutionary ideas of Marx and Engels. But the powerful and dynamic expansion of capitalism exerted a corrupting influence. The working class grew in numbers, socialist votes mounted at elections, resulting in greater representation in parliaments; the parties became mass parties with growing and prospering institutions. Democratic reforms, and other concessions, that capitalism could afford to give, the more conservative members were anxious to preserve. Social reformism found nourishment in this soil. The leaders, whose influence grew with the growth of the parties adapted themselves to the needs of capitalism; they became anxious to preserve the political status quo. Under their direction the practice of class collaboration replaced the policy of class struggle. Losing sight of the socialist objective, the leaders set about reconciling the workers to capitalist rule. This culminated in their support of the imperialist government in World War I. Thus was negated the revolutionary essence of the early socialist movement.

The contradictions to which this gave rise created an inevitable opposite current. Out of the betrayals a left wing movement developed and it took on concrete form in the Bolshevik party. Thus the revolutionary essence of Marxism was restored to its rightful place in history, and restored on a higher level — the level of working class victory. With this victory, the Bolsheviks broke through and demolished the social-reformist barriers to working class advance. And as the development of social-reformism had in the preceding stage negated the revolutionary essence of Marxism, so this was, in its turn, negated. As a result of this negation of the negation the Bolshevik party became the most important link in a whole chain of historical developments. Its aims, its objectives and its program expressed the interests and the welfare of the working population, and it led the way to the realization of this program.

By their action the Bolsheviks taught the world a great lesson. They applied the Marxist analysis of history to the solution of the difficult and crucial problems of their time. There need be no doubt that the same methodology will provide equally fruitful results in dealing with the difficult and crucial problems of our time.

Venezuela Today

The Alliance for Progress has jerry-rigged a showcase to push its wares throughout Latin America. Analysis demonstrates that shopworn merchandise is being peddled

by L. David

ALTHOUGH the results of the last national census are not yet available, it is commonly understood that the present rural Venezuelan population is 2½ million, of which 800,000 are productive campesinos.

According to the Minister of Agriculture in 1956, 80 per cent of Venezuelan farmers occupied farms of an average size of 3 hectares; the remaining 20 per cent occupied farms 30 times larger. The incomes of the campesino *families* were estimated in 1958 by a professor of the Central University as follows: 14 per cent did not produce anything for sale but only for family consumption; 20 per cent had an annual gross income of 85 dollars; 13 per cent varied from 88 dollars to 176 dollars. Almost half, therefore, have gross annual incomes of less than 176 dollars. Thirty-three and a half per cent had gross annual incomes from 176 to 1,298 dollars, leaving only 20 per cent of the total with gross annual incomes in excess of 1,320 dollars. As one can see, the situation of the campesino is miserable and he belongs to the only class which, during the economic boom of the 50's, did not improve its condition.

The above figures refer to the classes which have been termed: "Conuqueros" or small landowners; semi-proletarians of the countryside, who are half serf and half "Conuqueros"; and the average campesino. But co-existing with these three categories is agrarian exploitation of a more strictly capitalist character. According to Domingo Alberto Rangel, General Secretary of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, this exploitation is actually more important than that of the latifundios. Capitalist exploitation signifies on the one hand an agrarian bourgeoisie which has introduced into the countryside modern techniques and machinery, and on the other hand a rural proletariat which does not work on a share-hold basis with the landlord, but receives only a salary.

THE PROLETARIAT in the strict sense, that is to say the working class subject to a salary and the discipline of a boss, comprises a population of 400,000 persons. These include 20,000 petroleum laborers (the other 20,000 petroleum workers are not laborers but employees, i.e. foremen and white collar workers), 8,000 in mining, 200,000 in the manufacturing industries, whose principal branches are food and beverages, cigarettes, textiles and clothing, wood and furniture, paper and cardboard, graphic arts, hides and leather, rubber, chemical products and non-metallic minerals, metal products and vehicle assembly. We must also include the 80,000 construction workers, the transport workers and those in public works. After these, the unemployed, whom Marx called the industrial reserve army, reach the figure of 400,000 and form an integral part of the proletariat.

Strictly speaking, we do not include among the proletariat the immense legion of office workers and supervisors whose work is mainly intellectual. Their numbers should be considerable because we know that they are located predominantly in the branches of activity known as "commerce and services" which uses more than one-third of Venezuelan labor according to information from the Memoria del Banco Central for 1960 (in education alone there are 35,000). From the strictly sociological point of view, they are as proletarian as the workers because their source of income is salary; but classes are not determined exclusively by the relationships of production. The overwhelming majority of those persons belong to what is called the New Middle Class. They feel themselves in solidarity with the petty bourgeoisie, and with it they oscillate to the right and to the left.

We must judge the petty bourgeoisie as a particular class with its own interests, very distinct from those of the upper bourgeoisie. At this stage of the colonial revolution, the Venezuelan petty bourgeoisie feels very uncomfortable and impoverished and has shown the inclination to follow the proletariat as opposed to that of the upper bourgeoisie.

The most numerous and heterogeneous class of the nation is this petty bourgeoisie. Their specific weight is so considerable that in moments of crisis, it has been and will be the determining factor of the course of society. This does not signify that the middle class must lead the revolution or the counterrevolution, but the struggling group that knows how to win this fluctuating petty bourgeoisie to its side will triumph.

The petty bourgeoisie are middlemen and retailers, the liberal professionals and qualified technicians, intellectuals and teachers, students, office workers and those who, besides their work, enjoy the benefits of small properties.

Although the interests of this very complex class are similar all over the country, their political inclination varies according to geographic location. This is a result of

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This is a condensation of an article from the Venezuelan revolutionary socialist journal *Voz Marxista* of May, 1962. All money figures have been translated into approximate dollar equivalents. The political parties designated in the article by initials are as follows: U.R.D., Republican Democratic Union; M.I.R., Movement of the Revolutionary Left; P.C.V., Communist Party of Venezuela; A.D., Democratic Action (Old Guard); A.D.-A.R.S., centrist grouping within A.D.; C.O.P.E.I., Christian Socialist Party.

the different stages of maladjustment of the traditional relationships (whether in the capital, the large cities or in the provincial towns). In the interior these relationships have not deteriorated as much as in the city.

This social class has been very much affected by the cost of living which has increased some 40 per cent in the last three years, by the decrease in salaries, by the increase of taxes, by the incapable administration of the government, by the persistence of corruption and fraud in public administration, by the surrender of national interests into foreign and oligarchical hands, and by the increase of delinquency; in a word, by social degeneration.

Since the consolidation of the petroleum industry, those in the business of importation have been the most powerful; until 1960, one-third of the circulating capital was channeled into the import business. Today the national bourgeoisie, which is the industrial bourgeoisie, has more money and a more favorable field of action than the comprador bourgeoisie. In 1961 the capital invested in industry was five times greater than the capital employed in commerce. The importers were obliged to invest a good part of their capital in industry, although not in heavy industry. Investment has been in the manufacture of clothing, footwear, food, cigarettes, pharmaceutical products and the assembly of automobiles (we must remember that the parts come manufactured from the outside).

WHILE the general living standards of the population have decreased appreciably, the dividends of the big bourgeoisie have increased. The present crisis has greatly impoverished the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, but has rendered high profits to the masters of domestic finance.

The bourgeoisie criticizes the administrative insufficiency shown by the government which is an obstacle to business, but it understands that a regime such as this is the only guarantee for its continued growth. Such a regime offers less risks than a military dictatorship. The fickleness of the left phraseology that sometimes flows from the lips of some government officials is a defect that can be corrected while the representatives of the financial oligarchy climb the steps to the ministries, thanks to a well-balanced corruption of the public servants.

From this we can state that the possible contradictions between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie are incomparably inferior to the prevailing identity of their interests. There will be some struggle between imperialist sectors and the national bourgeois strata, but since they are common exploiters and have a common fear of an insurgence of the masses — they prefer to evade collisions and to divide the market. In that division, the victors will be the imperialists, for only they possess sufficient capital to exploit our mineral resources. This privilege is recognized without discussion by the national oligarchies.

The feudal class is slowly losing power on the national scene. Already under the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez capitalist exploitation in the countryside represented a greater store of wealth than the latifundios. The low productivity of the latter is so notorious that they have had no alternative but to sell their lands privately or to the government, or to introduce modern machinery and wage labor in place of decadent contractual relationships. When confronted with the efficiency of modern farming, the old landowner succumbs.

The division of the land, which began in 1958, has also struck a blow at the latifundio even before the operation was known as the agrarian reform. The leader of the Campesino Federation stated that the parcelling of the land had benefitted 30,000 of the 400,000 campesino families who need land, although only 10,000 were placed in productive conditions. Latifundism, properly speaking, is not a considerable force in Venezuela. The territorial landlords still exercise economic power in so far as they have become capitalist exploiters.

Indubitably, the number of hectares exploited by means of feudal relations, or which are not fully exploited, are much greater than the number exploited by means of capitalist relations; thus there remain immense plains and forests. This is a geographic concept which, at best, gives an idea of the unjust distribution of the Venezuelan lands and of the wilderness which dominates them rather than of the effective power of the latifundistas. The exploitation of the center, east and west of the country, which is directed by the agrarian bourgeoisie, yields much more than the interminable prairies where it is difficult to find a living soul. Thus we can conclude: the bourgeois class possesses incomparably more power than the feudal class.

Economic Perspectives

The economic crisis which began under the dictatorship and which was one of the causes of its downfall, has been aggravated recently. Perez Jiménez left a public debt of 990 million dollars, approximately the amount that Betancourt owes in foreign loans. The annual national budget is the highest in Venezuela's history, more than 1,320 million dollars. Eighty per cent of this goes to pay the administrative bureaucracy, the police, the army and social expenses.

Solutions to the budget deficit are sought through foreign loans which threaten the solvency of the country and also through increased taxes which weigh heavily on the workers as cost of living increases.

Unemployment exists not only in the cities but also in the rural areas because of the relationships of production there. The extremely low yield on the Venezuelan countryside is evident when we realize that agricultural output is only 7 or 8 per cent of the national product.

The bourgeoisie and the government realize that the present level of unemployment creates an explosive situation; if it has not already exploded it is due to the lack of a capable political leadership. They know that the only possible solution is two-fold: agrarian reform and industrialization. Without the first, the second cannot be realized for there will be no market for industrial products.

The Alliance for Progress

Imperialism is also conscious of the gravity of the situation. It is not surprising then that Washington launched the Alliance for Progress, aimed primarily at the most unstable nations, among them Venezuela.

Mr. Moscoso, the Alliance coordinator, laments bitterly about the incomprehension which the program has encountered in the governing circles of the Latin American countries. He complains that the Latin American oligarchies have refused to take the first steps to change the semi-feudal structure, and that they have refused to follow the example set by Betancourt in Venezuela. He reminds them of the punishment suffered in Cuba. But does the U.S. really wish to rejuvenate the Latin American social structure?

It is not a question of Kennedy having been converted into a revolutionary, of being prepared to implement the agrarian and industrial reform required to convert these dependent countries into independent capitalist nations. By exhibiting the Betancourt regime as a model for Latin America, Washington admits that its efforts are modest. It simply wishes to encourage the building of secondary industries which will not compete with their major interests in the business of exportation; this would give a certain stability to the national bourgeoisie, with whom it looks for a more or less durable compromise, and would lower the high percentage of unemployment. What other explanation is there for Washington, through the Venezuelan Corporation of Promotion, aiding small industry? It is encouraging the elimination of feudal relationships on the land, in order to contain the revolutionary aspirations of the campesinos. However, this does not solve the agrarian problem.

Imperialism, in other words, is striving to add a few more years of life to its system. To what more can it aspire if its condemnation by history is inevitable? The

Eisenhower administration had a conservative investment policy and publicly proclaimed the stabilization of the dollar in order to guarantee the general stability of its economy. This policy compromised United States' influence in other advanced countries and colonies. Kennedy has instituted a policy of vast expenditures which improves the immediate situation, without facing up to the grave crisis that is coming.

VENEZUELA has already received the first benefits of the 20 billion dollars promised by Dillon at Punta del Este. The program furthered the construction of highways and aqueducts and similar works. The U.S. has also promised to send surplus agricultural produce. Undoubtedly these methods lower unemployment somewhat and will permit the national bourgeoisie to maneuver for a certain time between imperialism and the revolution.

Haven't they succeeded in Bolivia in paralyzing the revolution for ten years by demoralizing its leaders? Isn't it a notorious fact that the fear which seized the investors after the overthrow of the Venezuelan dictator, Jiménez, has yielded to new confidence, and the complaints of the investors about the lack of "social peace" are not as insistent?

The so-called Venezuelan agrarian reform is an eloquent example of the real results of the Kennedy plan. Economically its fruits are despicable; but with the demagogy of distributing pieces of land and some credit Betancourt and Kennedy have succeeded in maintaining the support of important sectors of the campesinos who, after the distribution, don't know what to do with their "property."

Does the Venezuelan revolution then find itself in the critical position of having to wait for the years to pass? Marxism has nothing in common with economic mechanistic determinism. The blind forces of the economy can be conquered by conscious human action because the economy is a product of human action. And in this case with the greatest reason: already we have said that the result of the maneuvers which the Kennedy plan permits the bourgeoisie, is relative; everything depends on the existence of a revolutionary leadership, on the power of the labor movement, on the precise economic situation and on the international context.

Political Panorama

From the preceding considerations we can conclude that the arenas of struggle for the conflicting social classes are precisely determined. The battle must be engaged in the field of the class struggle: on the right, imperialism, in alliance with the national bourgeosie, trying to survive and maintain its privileges, and seeking to do away with feudalism, because it sees in it an inconvenient partner; on the left, the proletariat which has the historic mission of leading the Venezuelan revolution and for this reason should be ready to attract the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

There are comrades on the left who are inclined to the supposition that the struggle is going to turn fundamentally against imperialism and feudalism, and that in it they can play the role of temporary ally of some sectors of the native bourgeoisie. When they call for the "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution," they overlook the fact that native feudalism plays a lesser role than that played by the upper bourgeoisie. They forget that the only possible way to defeat imperialism is to remove the power of the national bourgeoisie. We must assimilate the lessons derived from the proletarian revolutions which have occurred up to the present; we must bring up to date the position which Lenin took against the Mensheviks in 1917; we must analyze the thinking of the Latin American bourgeoisie after the disappointment which they suffered in Cuba. If the industrial cloak of the native bourgeoisie could display an anti-imperialist role, why has it not done so in Venezuela where the industrial bourgeoisie is now more powerful than the comprador bourgeoisie?

OUR way to the revolution is the genuine one of the total class struggle, not exclusively political. When we attack the government we explain to the masses that we are also attacking the economic interest behind the government, explaining what these interests are. As Marxists, we know that Betancourt and Caldera are the grey eminences behind whom hide the perverse interests of foreign monopoly and the Jesuitic ingenuousness of the native exploiter. We do not wish to deceive the Venezuelan masses by telling them that the disease is rooted in the stuffed shirts that today occupy the seats of power; that if the superstructure of the present government were destroyed, abundance and liberty would appear all over Venezuela.

We propose to inform the Venezuelans that the task is more arduous, but also more certain. If we propose a united front, we wish only a united front of the oppressed classes. We are not concerned about the ideological leadership of the various sectors that would go to make up the united front. What is important is the relationship of each sector to the exploited classes. Above all, the workers, campesinos and middle class of all parties ought to unite, not excluding members of the governing Democratic Action.

The error has been made of seeing this struggle in a strictly partisan sense. The impression is left that on the one side will be the URD, AD-ARS, MIR and PCV and on the opposite side will be the AD and COPEI. If the first four were all proletarian or campesino parties and the last two were composed solely of exploiters, no one could take exception to this type of planning. But important sectors of the Venezuelan workers still support AD, above all in the interior of the country; COPEI is still revered by the campesinos of the Andes, and AD-ARS can hardly be characterized as being the representative of the workers.

For our task of the preparation of the revolution, our relations *with the base* of the URD or AD-ARS will be the same as with the base of the other group of AD, because it is our duty to attract them to the arena of class struggle for socialism and to eliminate the factional differences between them. In this way we can emphasize that which unites them: exploitation, defeatism and poverty.

With respect to the direction of those bourgeois parties, the fact that they find themselves in the opposition does not mean that they have changed their bourgeois orientation for a proletarian orientation. To form an alliance with them is to repeat the mistake committed on the 23rd of January, 1958, when everyone was invited to "unity," with the result that the wealthy again rose to power. This would have been a unique lesson except that the history of the five continents is full of examples of this type.

IN a developed capitalist country any front with the bourgeois parties is criminal; it is only permissible with some radical petty bourgeois organizations and before a threat like that of imminent fascism. Only in the colonies and semi-colonies can this type of front be admitted for

concrete objectives. The differentiation with the program of those parties must always be sharply established, criticism must not be silenced and the line of action must be clearly formulated.

Instead of criticizing our evasive partners, we fear that we are sacrificing our program in order to wrap ourselves all in the same cloak. Why deny that we are radicals, if in reality we are (or we wish to be)? Why say that we aspire to a "democratic and patriotic government," if what the humble multitudes wish is to throw the privileged ones out of power? Why not say once and for all that if the present rulers are substituted by others which are not of the MIR or of the PCV, we do not guarantee that a different policy will be followed?

Parliamentarianism

Lenin did not concede to parliament any other virtue than that of a rostrum for the dissemination of our ideas. In our House of Deputies, the government finds itself in the minority. The opposition, however, is not united. The leaders of the URD and AD-ARS parties try to capitalize on the presidential elections and outside of the legislative maneuvers, have not shown any desire to become organs of the masses for the conquest of power. In reality, they have manifested everything to the contrary. In the composition of parliament the bourgeois elements have more representation than the workers. For this reason, it is an illusion to imagine that Congress, (or at least the House of Deputies) could become the seat of dual power which would challenge the Executive. At most, Congress could become a propaganda factory against the regime. Only the formation of a body very different from the Venezuelan Congress could suggest the hope of repeating on American soil the glories of the Petrograd Soviet. This would be asking too much of the URD and AD-ARS members of Congress.

The Immediate Past

Some pessimists argue that this is a task of colossal proportions, and that we must seek support from the ranks of all political opponents. The greatest strength will not be realized by grouping together the largest number of different organizations, but in organizing under a Marxist leadership the hundreds of thousands of discontented beings in the cities and in the countryside.

The popular anger against the Betancourt government, when it became obvious that it was defending foreign and national monopolies, was capitalized almost exclusively by a single party which had just been formed; we refer to ourselves, of the MIR, who, on appearing on the scene came up against all the forces of the right and center. What happened, that a small group of inexperienced young men changed over night into a mass party, after which the masses of the principal cities marched, showing terror in the government, and disconcerting even those who in the beginning had extended a hand to us?

In order to be strong, it is necessary to be right. Our line was correct and that was enough to enable us to be heard and followed everywhere. The mistake was committed after, when our inexperience yielded to the provocations of the skillful President of the Republic. The President harassed our paper, jailed many of our leaders, and many of us, confusing our own problems with the problems of others, believed the time had come to call for the popular insurrection. Nevertheless the provocations against us proved costly to Betancourt because the successes of October and November of 1960 made his regime stagger.

Two lessons are obvious from these events: a revolutionary line that rejects class collaboration is enough to unite the majority and it is necessary to know when the decisive moment has arrived and not allow ourselves to be compromised by provocations and impatience.

Provocation and Impatience

The government was encouraged by its trial provocation and has continued the practice; dead bodies in the streets, prisons full of leftist militants, closing of the premises of MIR and PCV, closing down of newspapers, threats, suspension of constitutional guarantees. It is necessary to fight against all of this, but how? One factor that reveals much concerning the stability of any regime is the degree of disorganization of its military forces. We must realize that there are still no symptoms of this. If we assess the phenomenon objectively, we must recognize that the evidence is all to the contrary. The panic that took hold of the Caracas police agents has been overcome.

In the countryside the formation of guerrilla bands has come up against the cold welcome dispensed by the campesinos. The campesinos are still the principal base of the government. If the "agrarian reform" of Betancourt has had any merit, it has been that of prolonging the hopes of the campesinos. For some reason, it is the people of the countryside and not of the cities who come to Caracas to publicly demonstrate support for the regime, as happened on the 13th of February, 1962. Without a sincere support from part of the countryside it is impossible to think of guerrillas. It is irresponsible to play the aventurer with the lives of our most audacious people; it is criminal to abandon ourselves to putschism characteristic of desperados.

If there have been partial failures, it is necessary to rectify the political line. If the government has been able to break relations with Cuba and to attack it at Punta del Este, if Kennedy could visit Venezuela with impunity, if they have struck a blow at the Campesino Federation, if the Confederation of Workers has been divided, if the repressions have been increased, it is because we have been too weak to defend ourselves.

Even though the government has had sufficient capacity for its abuses, this does not contradict the fact that its base of support has been reduced to a part of the provincial petty bourgeoisie, to the bureaucratic union organization and to a portion of the campesinos. To compensate for this it now counts on the unqualified support of imperialism and the upper bourgeoisie and consequently of the army and the church. This, they believe will make the electoral events relatively quiet, because of the resources of propaganda and bribery which their millions permit.

The Venezuelan people do not support the present official trend but, as yet, they have not moved to the left in great numbers. Our primary obligation is to correct our present orientation and move forward to the conquest of the urban and rural masses, who wait for the party that will guide them, not half way (the bourgeois parties can do that) but to the socialist revolution.

Review Article

Gerhart Hauptmann (1862-1946)

by Trent Hutter

IT IS a pity that one of the greatest playwrights of world literature and one of Europe's last classical writers has remained almost unknown to the American public, although he not only stayed at Meriden, New York, in 1894, but received an honorary doctor's degree at Columbia University in New York City in 1932. (Oxford University had made him an honorary doctor already in 1905. And he won the Nobel Prize in 1912.)

Fortunately, a paperback edition (Bantam Classics) containing English translations of some of his most successful plays has now appeared in this country; and it is to be hoped that many Americans will become acquainted with Gerhart Hauptmann, a pioneer of the social drama, in the year of the 100th anniversary of his birth, November 15, 1862. Impressive anniversary celebrations are planned in Germany and other European countries, and many of his plays will be performed. Even without this centennial they would, however, not be forgotten; quite a few of them form part of the repertory of German theaters; and time and again, one or the other of Hauptmann's works has been made into a motion picture. For Hauptmann's genius remains very much alive; and the sometimes distorting film versions of his plays are a consequence of his durable popularity.

I shall try to briefly analyse the basic significance of Gerhart Hauptmann's work and personality, rather than to comment individually on his selected plays in the American pocket edition. Yet, in speaking of Hauptmann, it is, of course, indispensable to refer to some of his creations.

When Hauptmann was young, the German Socialists were being persecuted by Prince Bismarck's government. Hauptmann was a witness, in 1887, at the Breslau trial of a group of Socialists. Not actually a militant and no party politician, he nonetheless strongly sympathized with them. Hauptmann's first play, *Before Dawn* (1889) — already a masterwork and considered extremely controversial in those days — declares war on capitalism and bourgeois hypocrisy, opportunism and cynicism. The tragedy's hero resembling young Hauptmann to a large extent, is obviously a Socialist. Originally, the drama's title was to be "The Sower"; and a sower of socialist ideas the author undoubtedly was.

But Hauptmann never wrote superficial propaganda plays. In addition to the social question, another serious problem is on his mind. The 19th century was the century of the industrial revolution and of a scientific revolution as well. With profound insight, Hauptmann understood both phenomena very early. Science could be a powerful factor of knowledge and progress. Misinterpreted, falsified, over-simplified or wrongly applied, it could also spell danger. The hero of *Before Dawn* causes the girl who loves him to commit suicide, when too rigid an adoption of the biological theory of heredity is pushed to extreme conclusions and thereby to absurdity: since she comes from a family of alcoholics, he rejects and destroys her, although she is perfectly healthy herself . . .

Prophetically, the poet-playwright visualized the threat and destructive effect of a combination of pseudo-science and dogmatism, which, 50 years later, was to culminate in the death orgy of Nazi Fascism when Hitler — born in 1889, the year of *Before Dawn* — had 6 million human beings killed in the gas chambers because they belonged to the Jewish "race": genocide based upon the pseudo-biological concept of a human race that does not exist as such and its alleged inferiority.

At a time when the Liberals believed science and the machine were progressive in themselves, Hauptmann perceived that man had to dominate them if they were not to subjugate him. He warns of the de-individualized machine man. The machine becomes a monster breeding monstrosities if it is not used for man's own good. Hauptmann is not one of those poets who merely glorify the machine, nor one of those who merely condemn it. He was aware of its marvelous potential but also of the complex relationship between society, man and machine, which determines the role of the latter. Never was his attitude reactionary. Never did he simply wish to go back to an earlier phase of social development.

In 1844, the starving weavers of Silesia, Hauptmann's homeland, had revolted in desperation against unemployment and the lowering of their wages following the ascendency of Irish linen on the world market, the massive importation of cotton and the introduction of mechanical looms. One of the preludes of the

1848 revolution, the revolt had inspired a moving poem by the great Heinrich Heine. And it became the subject of Gerhart Hauptmann's most famous play: *The Weavers,* completed and published in 1892. Its performance was first forbidden by the Prussian police. It was finally permitted by a court decision in 1893; but after its public premiere in Berlin, in 1894, Emperor William the Second had the imperial box cancelled at the theater in question. In Austria, *The Weavers* was banned until 1904; and even then it was censored.

The Weavers amounted to a triumph of social realism. It is a drama without the traditional "hero" or "heroine," the drama of proletarians in revolt and of their defeat, a drama of their hopes and furor. We see the exploiters and their lackeys. We see the exploited and the unscrupulous outsiders, the adventurers desirous of profitting from the weavers' misery and indignation. Each person is sharply profiled as an individual. And, as in other Hauptmann plays, each one speaks exactly as he would in real life. Other authors had used regional dialects to produce a comical effect. Hauptmann had the opposite aim. Through the use of dialect in a proletarian tragedy he underlined the Silesian dialect's pertinency and sensitiveness and thereby the dignity of the workers.

Gerhart Hauptmann's intelligence was luminous, his understanding of social problems remarkable; and he mastered the playwright's craft as few others have done, with all the devices that enhance a play's effect. But above all, he wrote with his heart. He wrote with love and pity. Without this deep emotional and moral involvement, his plays would not be the masterworks they are.

He knew the people he was writing about, knew their faith and feelings. He talked for example in 1891 with surviving veterans of the weavers' upheaval and studied the locale carefully. And he loved his people. His own ancestors had been weavers. But he knew the proletariat of Berlin and its language just as well, as he had lived there for years. He never was just a poet of local lore.

Set in 16th century Franconia, *Florian Geyer,* Hauptmann's gigantic tragedy of the Peasants' War (1524-25), written after *The Weavers* as an answer to the bourgeoisie's clamoring for new measures against the Socialists, presents the social classes of the time of the Reformation, with a total of 80 speaking persons to represent them! Again, the author carefully studied the locale and even tried to imitate 16th century language. *Florian Geyer* depicts the failure of the German peasants' revolution against the princes of the Catholic Church, the feudalists, and the rising bourgeoisie of the cities. Florian Geyer, a knight, joined the oppressed, impoverished, God-seeking peasants and became their leader, fought to the last, and heroically fell in battle.

At a time when the bourgeoisie was convinced that the powerful German Reich (Empire) was invincible and pursuing the road of continuous, uninterrupted progress and prosperity, Hauptmann felt it was rushing towards a catastrophe. He had written a most enjoyable comedy, *The Beaver Fur,* a bitingly realistic satire on the arrogance and narrow-mindedness of Prussian officialdom; but about 17 to 19 years later, in 1910, he pointed out the underlying decay of the seemingly happy and glamorous Empire of the Kaiser in his tragicomedy, *The Rats,* in which he particularly castigated the oppression by imperial Germany of the Polish minority in the East. A Polish servant girl of aristocratic ancestry is pushed around and abandoned in Berlin. She is alternately cajoled, threatened, brutalized. Her illegitimate child is taken from her; and the childless woman who pretends the baby is her own has the Polish girl removed from the scene by her criminal brother when she, the real mother, claims the infant. The servant girl is murdered by the woman's brother. And in the house where the play is set, a former military barracks, a gang of professional criminals sings patriotic songs. We also meet a rebel (again resembling young Hauptmann), a naïve rank-and-file unionist, and a hypocritical super-patriot.

Hauptmann was a true realist. He never painted of the proletariat an abstract, idealized propaganda picture. He was not afraid to show the weaknesses, the fears and the short-comings, frequently conditioned by the social situation of the class. And precisely because of their social realism, Hauptmann's plays also are highly symbolic, as all great realistic dramas are. This symbolism is especially evident in Hauptmann's case. The individual figure also represents a social force and situation, as well as a certain historical development, and its significance therefore transcends the individual's uniqueness. And the playwright's art underscores through his story's traits and twists the symbolical value and meaning of the drama.

Twenty years after *The Rats,* when the Weimar Republic was shaking under the depression and when the fast expanding Nazi party prepared the destruction of the labor movement and of bourgeois democracy, Hauptmann, now almost seventy, again sensed an impending catastrophe. In *Before Sunset* (1931), the tragedy of a seventy-year old publisher loving a girl in her twenties and being loved by her, but running into opposition from his children and particularly his son-in-law who destroys him, a changeover inside the German bourgeoisie is clearly expressed, albeit without any illusion to politics. The gripping play is far more than the story of an older man falling in love. Commercial Councillor Matthias Clausen, modeled after Hauptmann's friend, wealthy bibliophile Max Pinkus, is one of the heirs to Germany's tradition of spiritual greatness, of humanism and classic-romantic literature, thoroughly cultured, and a patrician who grew up in an era when capitalism, on the whole, still had a progressive function in the development of productive forces. His son-in-law and enemy, Klamroth, who gets control of the family and of Clausen's newspapers, is uncultured, unscrupulous, vulgar, determined to do anything to reach his goal. He is the representative of the cold new "managerial" type of the era of monopoly capitalism. In order to further their aims, the Klamroths were about to hand power to Hitler, to

consent to the demolition of the humanist-rationalist heritage in which they were not interested.

Except for the youngest son (the one remaining hope for the future), Clausen's entire family, including his older son, a university Professor, and a daughter-in-law who is the daughter of a ruined general —official science and the military caste—side with Klamroth against the father; and so does the Professor's friend, a jurist. The sun was indeed setting over Germany and Hauptmann was the witness of the old Germany's death.

Hauptmann's work is tremendously vast and many-sided. Besides his numerous plays, he wrote novels, short stories, autobiographical pieces, poems and epic poetry. He was the last great writer of epics, and they reflect his and the German people's experiences in times of crisis. The word realism would not be sufficient to characterize Hauptmann's entire, enormous output. Part of his work is marked by social realism, part is romantic, and another part takes up, in Hauptmann's own way, the tradition of the classics. These are not styles or phases that succeed each other in Hauptmann's life. They were simultaneous. They coincided. Hauptmann was a realist, a romantic, a classicist; and any image of this genius would be false if it were to ignore any of these three facets.

His realism, romanticism and classicism do not at all contradict each other. I have already tried to indicate the higher and wider reality behind the realistic surface of some of his plays. This goes for his entire work, including the romantic and classicist creations. Hauptmann always resorts to the form and style best suited to what he wants to express. His romanticism is never anti-rational, quite the opposite. Hauptmann was an admirer of Lessing, the towering figure of Germany's 18th century enlightenment who opened the classic age of German literature. There is no room in Hauptmann's work for muddled thinking or a denial of reality, the inner reality of his creatures and their relation to the world.

Those who are under the influence of the Stalinists' literary dogmatism will not be able to understand a universal figure like Gerhart Hauptmann. To him, the myth is the poet's highest accomplishment. In our daily use of the word, the myth is just an untrue story; but of course, Hauptmann used it in a very different sense. The poet creates a story which is not necessarily probable and can dispense with surface reality, as it is only in the freedom this form affords him that he is able to crystallize a certain vision and feeling of the world and its underlying reality. The figures of the myth are powerfully alive, nursed with certitude, longing and experience, not coldly allegorical but embodying as distinct individuals human forces (and sometimes extra-human forces of nature) that shape the world, conveying through their character and actions a truth that could not be communicated in another way, a formula of condensation of a vast and complex reality in the world and in our soul.

Let us not forget that even the realistic drama is not simply a photograph of reality but must be a clever composition that radiates an illusion of reality. Hauptmann's foremost romantic drama, *And Pippa Is Dancing* (1905), "a glass-works legend" set in Silesia's mountains, a mythical creation, actually is full of realism in the characters, their basic situation in the world, in countless details and in the over-all significance behind the surface. And this applies to Hauptmann's romanticism and classicism in general.

Much as he was attached to Silesia, his native province where he resided with his (second) wife Margarete, a violinist, in his beautiful house Wiesenstein at Agnetendorf in the Giant Mountains (Riesengebirge), Gerhart Hauptmann was not provincial and had his eye on Germany and the world. Since 1929, the handsome, sturdily built poet had a second home at Hiddensee, a Baltic island were his remains were buried in 1946 by local fishermen. He frequently stayed in Italy and Switzerland, visited Greece and loved all these countries. Greek antiquity, that cradle of our civilization, inspired him. French theater audiences acclaimed him; and so did Gorky and other revolutionary Russian writers on the occasion of Hauptmann's 60th birthday, in 1922. And Hauptmann helped to mobilize world opinion in the campaign to aid the Soviet people during the famine of the early twenties. Several states bestowed medals and other honors on the playwright-poet. Over the CBS network, he spoke to the American people about Goethe in 1932. Yet, Gehart Hautmann was deeply rooted in the soil of Silesia.

When Hitler seized power in 1933, Hauptmann did not emigrate because to him it would have been a psychological impossibility. A homeless refugee, practically begging in a foreign country at the age of 71, he would have withered in no time. Thomas Mann was able to emigrate because his personality was different, because he was younger, and because he had a sufficient income from his novels in foreign countries, too. Thomas Mann was a son of Lubeck, a maritime city, a door to the world, while Gerhart Hauptmann was a son of the Silesian mountains. Both authors, represented the finest tradition of the German spirit, and both did the right thing because they both acted in accordance with their own individual nature without surrendering to the Nazi anti-spirit, to fascist insanity. Hauptmann, while continuing to live and work in Germany, with various trips abroad, never made any serious concession to the Nazi regime, although the Nazis would have liked to use him for their propaganda, prominent and venerated as he was.

Hauptmann remained true to himself. When his Jewish friend Max Pinkus died in 1934, Hauptmann was the only "Arian" to attend the funeral of the man who, only two years earlier, had still been called a public benefactor by those who now did not have the courage to pay their respects to a Jew. Under the Hitler regime, a gesture such as Hauptmann's amounted to a demonstration, for Hauptmann was very much a public figure. In 1937, in Rapallo, Italy, Hauptmann wrote his dramatic requiem, *The Darknesses,* dedicated to his encounter with the eternal values of the Jewish spirit (represented by Pinkus) and to the defense, in

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Africa, Truth and the Right to Travel

A courageous newspaperman warns his countrymen of the government and press conspiracy to withhold the truth

by William Worthy

IN the October, 1961 issue of *Nieman Reports,* published at Harvard University, Robert Sollen, wire editor on a California daily, wrote a devastating critique entitled "Wire Service Nationalism and Its Consequences." He amply documented his thesis of a sadly misled, misguided American public by quoting misleading and distorted wire-service dispatches from all areas of the globe.

Until the nationalism and the quasi-official party line disappear from the daily output of the mass media — and all signs indicate the distortions get more blatant rather than diminish — the American people will remain out of touch with the realities of life in Africa, Asia, and above all, Latin America.

In a column 13 months ago Walter Lippmann referred to the distressingly low level of American thinking on world affairs. Needless to say, his criticism is an indictment not only of the U.S. press, but also of leadership in our government, leadership in our educational system and leadership in the pulpit. Writing in the Boston *Globe* on May 18, 1961, Lippmann declared: "Our moral and intellectual unpreparedness for the reality of things is causing widespread demoralization among us . . ."

To illustrate my point, and the point Lippmann seems to be making, let me use the current Portuguese war of extermination in Angola as an example. There have been passing references in the press to Portugal's use of U.S. arms and planes to wipe out villages and to slaughter women and children, in a cruel and of course futile effort to crush the Angolese fight for freedom. The State Department, amidst denials, has nevertheless virtually admitted that such arms, supplied to Portugal through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are being so used.

But neither our double-talking government spokesmen nor the pious lovers of freedom who write the daily editorials about "the free world" have found the moral courage to place the blame where it belongs: first and foremost on the Kennedy administration and the government of the United States. After all, the issue is not really very important. It is only black freedom fighters — "semi-savages, you know" — who are dying from these Portuguese-NATO-United States aerial attacks. Tears are shed for freedom fighters only if it is Hungarians or East German Nordics who are being shot down. Indeed, usually our mass media refer to the Angolans and the Moslems in Algeria not as freedom fighters but as "terrorists."

Twenty-seven years ago there was a wave of revulsion around the world when the Italians were slaughtering Ethiopians from the air in that barbarous imperialistic war of conquest. Our press reported that wave of revulsion and our editorial writers weren't tongue-tied then because in 1935 the Italians weren't on our side. But in 1962, if you read the U.S. press from day to day — from the New York *Times* on down to the worst of the Hearst publications — you would never learn or dream that we appear to mankind to be just as barbarous, just as cruel, more cynically and hypocritically imperialistic for our help to the French in Algeria and Indo-China and our help to the Portuguese in Angola.

Naturally, the mass media have a convenient rationalization: "We can't risk antagonizing or losing France and Portugal as NATO allies." Africans denounce this as the thinking of imperialists. To Africans still living under the European whip the word "imperialist" is a harsh reality and not just a Moscow propaganda term. To Africans, this is thinking to be expected of the

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These are excerpts of remarks by William Worthy, foreign correspondent, Baltimore *Afro-American,* at the annual conference of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, June 23, 1962 in Baltimore, Maryland.

Mr. Worthy was invited to discuss his recent indictment for re-entering the U.S. (his native country) on October 10, 1961 "without bearing a valid passport," and also to discuss ways of improving African news coverage. Displayed in the hall were parts of a U.S.-supplied Napalm bomb and photographs from Angola brought back to this country by George M. Houser, executive secretary of the American Committee on Africa.

The man responsible for the Worthy indictment, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, addressed the conference on the previous evening.

leader of NATO, which Colonel Nasser has branded "an alliance of enslavement."

Among the photographs that George Houser of the American Committee on Africa brought back from Angola this year is one here in my folder that shows Angolan kids in a village receiving first aid medical treatment after one of those terrifying Portuguese air raids. From the standpoint of neglected news stories maybe I can show you how intellectually unprepared this country is to understand anti-colonial movements by quoting from a 1939 book by Pierre van Paassen, *Days of Our Years*. You should get the book out of the library and read pages 340 to 343 before the rapidly growing strength of the anti-colonial world overwhelms the West.

> "On the 30th of January (1936), the town of Kobbo (Ethiopia) . . . was subjected to an aerial bombardment . . . Chunks of human flesh were quivering on the branches of the trees . . . Mules and horses were pawing in their own entrails . . . The whitewashed church was bespattered with blood and brains . . . Men were running about howling with insanity, their eyes protruding from their sockets . . . One woman was sitting against a wall trying to push her bleeding intestines back into her abdomen . . . A man lay near by, digging his teeth and his fingers into the ground . . . A child sat on a doorstep whimperingly holding up the bleeding stumps of its arms to a dead woman whose face was missing . . .
>
> . . . Count Ciano, I learned later, was handing out medals to the flyers of the Disparata squadron in the salon of the military club of Asmara. It was one of the bombs Mussolini's son hurled that day on an Ethiopian cavalry squad that was later described in the boy's book as having had the effect of a 'sudden blossoming of red roses.' "

Before I quote further from van Paassen's book, let me again prod your conscience by reminding you that today, June 23, 1962, our United States arms are enabling the fascist Salazar dictatorship in Portugal to carry out in Angola a repeat performance of events in Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936. Tens of thousands of Angolans have been killed since March, 1961. That unforgettable passage about chunks of black human flesh quivering on tree branches helped to convert a man named Malcolm Little into a Black Muslim. A decade ago he was serving a term for burglary in a Massachusetts prison. He once told me that when he read that chapter in the prison library, his eyes were opened for the first time to the full dimensions of white Western "Christian" atrocities. Today that man is world famous as Minister Malcolm X.

Further on van Paassen wrote:

> "We found Korissa in an incredible state of confusion. The Italians had bombed it into ruins, and the victims of those raids lay in piles along the main streets. At every step I was surrounded by women and children who knelt and stretched out their hands imploringly for help. They took me for a foreign medical man or missionary. That they did not kill me — a white brother of the poison-spreading Italians — showed the innate goodness of these people. Had I been an Ethiopian, I think I would have smashed in the head of the first white man to have come within my reach . . .
>
> As a white man, I was filled with shame and for the first time I understood what Julian meant that day when, seeing the Christian mob attack with axes and then befoul the priceless statues of Praxiteles in the streets of Antioch, he remarked to a companion: 'Does it not fill you with loathing to know yourself of the same blood as these barbarians?' "

BASICALLY, our coverage of news from Angola, from the stirring interior of Mozambique, from the dirty war in South Vietnam, from the invasion site on the coast of Cuba, from all of the colonial areas is not going to improve until non-ambitious, human-minded reporters with the discernment and the empathy of a Pierre van Paassen are sent out on the important assignments. And the ultimate necessity for improving news coverage is for you, the publishers, to have the guts to resist the pressures we all know about and to print what is really going on.

Again I must say: Our daily papers, our giant weekly news magazines, our radio and television networks, with noble exceptions, are not going to report the anguish of an Africa struggling to rid itself of American-supported colonialism, American-supported neo-colonialism, American-supported colonial wars. An exception worth noting is the excellent and revealing dispatches from South Vietnam that have been appearing in the New York *Times*. Either the Negro press will rise to the great historic need and will report the struggle for African, Asian and Latin American freedom — perceptively, sympathetically, courageously — or the American people will go down the drain of history after dwelling a little while longer in ignorance, in fictitious bliss, in a cauldron of daily lies and misinterpretation unequalled in the history of the printed word.

One reason that the U.S. mass media will not, and psychologically cannot, report the hard facts, the bitter truth from Africa is that the owners of the mass media have too much of a stake in the status quo, emotionally, financially, socially. Tragically, the emotional stake trickles down to their not well paid employees. For their own good and for the good of the public, white reporters, in Washington and in foreign capitals, are much too close to our officials and to American ambassadors. The First Amendment does not say that the press is supposed to be an instrument of national policy. A famous Washington correspondent told my class of Nieman Fellows at Harvard that the private background dinner has a pervasively pernicious influence, particularly on news of foreign affairs. He told us that the average Washington correspondent will almost sell his soul just to be able to boast: "I dined with the Secretary of State last night."

I supposed that dining en mass with the Attorney General at a public banquet is not necessarily harmful or corrupting, provided the intimacy goes no further than that. But let's keep in mind that if U.S. support of colonialism is to be brought to an end, we must relentlessly keep the news spotlight on the crucial decisions of the policymakers, and that includes the President's brother. In a poorly reported speech at the Ovearseas

Press Club at the time of Lumumba's death, Edward Kennedy admitted that genuine African leaders regarded Tshombe, Mobutu and Kasavubu as "creatures of the American Central Intelligence Agency." In other words, the same old Uncle Tom diplomacy that the mass media *never* properly interprets. On January 12, 1961, on page 8, the respected Manchester Guardian Weekly stated that today the world regards not England nor the Soviet Union as the arch imperialist, but rather the United States of America.

IN a personal vein, may I add that our best efforts to put the American people in touch with reality can be thwarted at any moment by the imposition of arbitrary State Department travel bans. Very soon, all of the southern belt of Africa will explode into one giant "disturbed area." The fact that African nationalists are not racists, as Pierre van Paassen found out in those bombed-out villages, will not deter this government of ours from declaring that area out of bounds, on the specious grounds of "safety" and "not in the best interests of the United States."

The State Department and the Justice Department have disarmed the people and the press by having gotten away with their bans on travel to China, Cuba and other countries they don't like. The precedent for flimsy justification of travel controls has been fairly well established by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In the future, it will be distressingly simple for our officials to tell all reporters, or just Negro reporters, or just any reporter uninterested in protecting the huge American investments in southern Africa, to stay out of that area. Travel control is thought control and intellectual control, and no one knows and appreciates that more than do the policymakers who, without precedent in America's peacetime history, are now routinely telling citizens where they can and cannot go. Travel control is also a mighty weapon for depriving a newsman of a living.

It may interest you to know that the very concept of the right to travel got its first strong impetus on the medieval feudal estates. The feudal barons kept their serfs on the estates at all times. In times of drought or of other adverse conditions, the serfs were not permitted to travel elsewhere to seek work and means of survival. The concept of the right to travel sprang from the necessity of earning a living. As someone said to me yesterday, it is important to dispel the superficial notion that the right to travel is nothing more than the right to go away on a pleasant vacation.

In this light, I have welcomed the moral support and the frontpage coverage that the Negro press has given to my recent indictment. It has put the daily press to shame. The dailies realize that the Justice Department has made a monumental blunder and, for the most part, they seem to be trying to cover up for the government. But the mass media will be compelled, by the type of campaign we have planned, to pay attention to my case. Before this fight is over, domestic and worldwide publicity is going to wither the legal morons who dreamed up the idea of silencing me by instituting a criminal prosecution so absurd that even shoeshine boys, I have found, clearly see through it.

At the appropriate time I will welcome your legal support in the form of amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs. Freedom of the press is at stake, and this makes my fight your fight in a direct and immediate sense. Another close-to-your-heart issue is the bold, brazen racial discrimination on the part of the federal government in prosecuting me and only me, while doing nothing to any of the white citizens who have committed the very same "crime" of coming home without a passport.

I am more than grateful, I was delighted to receive the invitation to speak to you today, following last night's appearance here by the Attorney General of the United States, my adversary in court. I got the message. Mr. Kennedy, you may be certain, got the message. And what is so important when this conference is reported in the press of Africa together with Mr. Kennedy's insistence this week that I stand trial in Miami at the risk of physical violence, our brothers in Africa will also get the message. They will applaud and bless you.

Hauptmann . . .

(Continued from page 115)

a time of darkness, of its immense contribution to civilization. The Jewish contribution being an integral element of our culture, an ethical foundation, the attack against the Jews is an attack against us too, Hauptmann cried out. He realized how the blow also fell on the Germany he stood for.

In World War II, immediately before the end of Hitler's Third Reich, Hauptmann who had never aided Goebbels' war propaganda, witnessed and protested, without giving any support to the Nazis, the senseless destruction by Allied bombers of Dresden, one of Europe's splendid cultural centers, and the mass slaughter of tens of thousands of civilians. Not a man of hatred but of love and pity, the poet denounced the cold-blooded murder policy of total war and deplored the death of a city that had belonged to the common cultural heritage of Europe and mankind. The burning of Dresden in February, 1945, sapped the strength of the 82-year old.

He was in his Silesian home when the Soviet Army occupied East Germany. Russian and Polish officers treated the world-renowned patriarch of German literature with marked courtesy; but since Stalin had handed the purely German province of Silesia to the Poles, the entire Silesian population was expelled; and no exception could be made for Hauptmann. He was sick. The Soviet authorities offered to transport him with his wife and his movable possessions to Berlin in a special train. But before this could be done, Gerhart Hauptmann died at the Weisenstein where he had lived and worked since 1901, amidst his beloved Silesian mountains, on June 6, 1946. His last words were: "Am I still in my house?"

IN REVIEW

Marx and Modern Capitalism

by Myra Tanner Weiss

MONOPOLY CAPITAL, by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, July-August issue, Monthly Review, 1962. $1.00.

This issue of the *Monthly Review* introduces the forthcoming collaborative work of Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, tentatively called, "Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order." We are given two chapters of the book and an introduction by the authors, containing a brief summary of its objectives and contents.

In the bleak, dreary world of contemporary American economic literature, with its preoccupation with trivia and its pretentious gobbledegook, an attempt at a Marxist analysis of American society is indeed welcome.

The second chapter (Chapter 10 in the book), "On the Quality of Monopoly Capital Society," is the more simple one, interesting and very useful. It deals with the poverty that exists in America. The "Affluent Society" of Galbraith is shown to mean "slow starvation for millions of people." The modern American home, much publicized to the world in exhibitions, is shown for what it really is — a dilapidated, rat-infested slum. More than ten per cent of American dwellings lack even commonplace sanitary facilities. The new slums of suburbia and the tangled mess of transportation are discussed, and finally the unsolved and growing crises in the educational and cultural life of America.

These subjects are treated in popular style and with the objectivity of the scholar. The material is well documented.

However, the work as a whole tries more than to present a realistic picture of conditions in American society. It is an attempt to bring the science of Marxism up-to-date. In the introduction to their preview, the authors point out that Marx's basic work was formulated a century ago when competition was characteristic of capitalist society. Hilferding and Lenin brought Marxism up-to-date in the period that followed, the era of monopoly capitalism. "Yet paradoxically enough," say the authors, "the impact of this profound economic transformation was felt least of all in what might have been thought to be the area most affected: Marxian economic theory. Here, despite the pioneering work of Hildferding and Lenin, Marx's *Capital* continued to reign supreme. Or, to put the point differently, the model of a competitive capitalist economy continued to serve as the basis of Marxian economic theorizing.

"It is, we believe, time to break with this tradition . . ."

The task of applying the science of Marxism to the analysis of contemporary capitalist society is indeed an important one. It is also a difficult one, as the authors well know. And they say, "We are under no illusion that we will have succeeded in exhausting the subject. We have no such ambitious goal. What we do hope to do is help people to see things differently and more realistically, to highlight some of the central problems which need to be solved, and to indicate the direction which further study and thought should take."

In that spirit, and for our common objectives, we shall discuss some of the questions which the preview poses.

Sweezy and Baran find it paradoxical that Marx's *Capital* continued to "reign supreme" after Lenin's treatment of monopoly capitalism. But where is the paradox? Lenin did not regard the development of monopoly capitalism as a contradiction to the theories of Marx but a verification of them. And indeed, what else but monopoly could emerge from the laws of accumulation of capital, as elaborated by Marx.

Not only is concentration of wealth a direct product of capital accumulation, but centralization of capital (redistribution of capital — mergers, etc.) accelerates the tendency toward monopoly. As Marx pointed out, "Centralization in a certain line of industry would have reached its extreme limit, if all the individual capitals invested in it would have been amalgamated into one single capital. This limit would not be reached in any particular society until the entire social capital would be united, either in the hands of one single capitalist, or in those of one single corporation," (Vol. I, *Capital,* Kerr Edition, p. 689).

The centralization of capital is one of the centripetal forces in the accumulation of capital. There are other, centrifugal forces which inhibit the realization of the absolute limit, discussed by Marx in Volume I and in more detail in Volume III.

Lenin saw that at the turn of the century, the tendency toward monopoly had developed to the point of imperialist, or international capital domination, with finance capital playing the primary role of centralizer. In crediting Marx's analysis for his own understanding of the imperialist stage of capitalist development, Lenin was not being generous out of partisanship or inexact. He was simply being honest.

Perhaps we shall learn what the authors mean by the tradition with which we are advised to break in the material that will follow. But the two chapters given us provide few clues. It would seem that they want to do more than emphasize monopoly. It would seem that they want to pronounce competition dead.

In the first chapter (Chapter 2 of the book), "The Giant Corporation," the authors compare today's giant industrial organization with its predecessor, the company or corporation headed by its owner. They construct an abstract paradigm and attribute to it two major new characteristics: 1) It operates with a "longer time-horizon" and 2) It is "a more rational calculator." These are quantitative concepts, but the authors believe they make a qualitative difference. Most important, the "new" corporation has achieved a "systematic avoidance of risk" and has adopted a a policy of "live-and-let-live toward other members of the corporate world."

The authors recognize that the dog-eat-dog principle of competition still applies for the giant corporations in relation to small business. But they apparently see an elimination of competition at the top. Unfortunately, their discussion of this new quality of amiability

includes an example of the "corespective" behavior of the "Big Three" in auto. Before publication of their book, the Big Three are already threatening to become the Big Two. Chrysler, at this moment, is in a desperate struggle for survival.

There is an element of reality in the "new" qualities that Sweezy and Baran see in the giant corporation. When capitalism experiences growth, new products and new investments present less risk. Competition is minimized. More rational calculations are possible and all appears to be sweetness and light among the powers that be.

But as Marx pointed out long ago, this is merely the appearance. Any capitalist or corporation that doesn't know its fleeting character will not survive the crisis that inevitably will follow. But the capitalists, big and small, do know, most of them, and under this surface of security and amiability is the struggle for supremacy. Even in periods of prosperity it never ceases.

The "new" characteristics of monopoly capital cannot in any way contradict Marx's model of capitalism which consistently excludes the details of competition and assumes that the capitalists possess rationality and a long-time horizon. What has happened, at most, is the elimination of those aspects of nineteenth century capitalism from which Marx abstracts in his model.

Moreover in reality the ground of risk and competition has not been eliminated at all. It has simply shifted. The risk of the former capitalist owner of an enterprise is now the risk of an entire nation — risk of war and risk of revolution. Competition exists not only among the giants for control of the biggest of business, the capitalist government, but by these governments for competing national groups of corporations and financial powers.

It is not only small business that pleads with the giants for a policy of live-and-let-live, but entire nations. It is not only the Soviet world which pleads in vain for coexistence, not only the undeveloped nations (small business in the eyes of U.S. imperialists), but it is De Gaulle, it is Macmillan who plead for a policy of live-and-let-live.

Kennedy's trade program with Europe is the biggest risk in our economic history. Whole trades as well as individual enterprises are expected to be wiped out and promises of public compensation and "re-training" have to be made in advance.

It is no longer possible to discuss American economy without discussing world economy. It has been estimated that a third of the capital of the world is owned by U.S. imperialists. Competition among the industrial and financial oligarchies is largely expressed through government financial struggles. Risk on this plane is not the risk of the wealth, status and power of a rich family. As I have pointed out, it is risk of war or revolution. The Pentagon takes these risks for the giants and holds its breath in suspense. At stake is human existence.

There are a number of other theoretical questions that are raised by the views expressed by Baran and Sweezy, not the least of which is their underconsumptionist view of the capitalist crisis. It is to be hoped that these serious theoreticians will not revise Marx's theory of the falling rate of profit without specifically stating so and explaining their reasons. However, we must hold these questions in abeyance until the entire work is published.

Perhaps a suggestion is in order for the approach we should have in our analytical tasks. Our studies of modern capitalist economy might just as easily yield a verification of Marxist theory as the necessity to change it. The power of Marxist theory to prognosticate already has been tested and proved. Perhaps our difficulties are not with the theory of Marx, but with an inadequate grasp of it. In any event, Marxist theory and method should be our starting point in resolving the theoretical problems we confront.

Pilgrim of Hope

by Maria di Savio

WILLIAM MORRIS: ROMANTIC TO REVOLUTIONARY by E. P. Thompson. New York: Monthly Review Press; 1962. 908 pp. $8.50.

This is a big, awkward book, much like Morris himself, as Shaw put it, "in a drawing room," but as effective in the over-all result as Morris proved to be in his over-all greatness.

The author, a Staff Tutor at Leeds University, uses the panoramic style. While this technique accurately recreates the world of William Morris (the history of *everyone* of even slight importance connected with Morris and/or Socialism in 19th Century England is included), it can also lead to confusion. There is simply a greater mass of information within these 900 pages than can easily be handled at first reading.

In addition to diffuseness and a bewildering use of allusions, there is an over-all structural uneveness. The first part of the book relates Morris' early life, including his artistic development and the influence of Ruskin. The largest section is composed of a history of Socialism in Victorian England and Morris' part in it. The final section is a miscellany which includes analyses of several of Morris' more important works and a consideration of Morris as artist, Marxist, personality, and legend.

In spite of clumsy, even inferior, writing, Thompson nevertheless conveys the tragic greatness of this Socialist prophet. Yet Morris in his thirties had wistfully called himself an "idle singer of an empty day" and went on to ask in his poem, *The Earthly Paradise,* "Dreamer of dreams, born out of my due time, / Why should I strive to set the crooked straight?" Born into wealth, a furniture manufacturer all his life, a Socialist only the last fifteen years of his life, William Morris is most famous for this particular poem, his artistic contributions as a youthful Pre-Raphaelite, and his interest in handicraft decoration. Obscured by falsification and legend-building first by the Fabian Socialists and now by the British Labour Party, Morris' energetic and selfless political activity is misunderstood or neglected. This book does an excellent job in restating and reevaluating Morris, the Socialist. It also tackles the problem of the source of Morris' undeniable greatness. The author states:

> What was the source of the greatness of Morris — this growing stature which he assumes in the perspective of history? His poetry alone, or his work in the decorative arts — profound though its influence was — would hardly be sufficient to establish his claim to the universal greatness suggested by Shaw. As a political organizer his efforts ended in failure. His political theory, important as it is in the English tradition, appears as bold crayon-work beside the firm and fine-drawn analysis of Marx and Engels. As a theorist of the arts — despite all his profound insight — he failed to erect a consistent system, and muddled his way around some central problems. Did he make any major contribution to English culture which is marked by the stamp of unquestionable originality and excellence?
>
> The answer must be, "Yes." Morris' claim to greatness must be founded, not on any single contribution to English culture, in one field alone, but on the quality which unites and informs every aspect of his life and work. This quality might best be described as "moral realism": it is the practical moral insight of his political and artistic writings which gives them life.

As nebulous as "moral realism" might sound, it was undoubtedly the strength and genius of Morris. It impelled him to fight opportunists such as Hyndman and olympic philanthropists such as the Fabians. It was this honesty that turned

him from his initial sectarian position of refusing to support the workers' activities regarding strikes, unions, and political campaigns, to an authentic Marxist position. He eventually believed that the struggle for and amelioration of workers' conditions gave the working class confidence and, more important, aroused their imaginations as to what society could and should be. Most notable — and tragic — is that Morris accurately foretold, by way of warning, what would happen if the reformists were able to mislead the working class. In his essay *Communism,* Morris cautioned:

> I want to know and to ask you to consider, how far the betterment of the working people might go and yet stop at last without having made any progress on the direct road to Communism. Whether in short the tremendous organization of civilized commercial society is not playing the cat and mouse game with us socialists. Whether the Society of Inequality might not accept . . . quasi-socialist machinery . . . and work it for the purpose of upholding that society in a somewhat shorn condition, maybe, but a safe one. . . . The workers better treated, better organized, helping to govern themselves, but with no more pretence to equality with the rich, nor any more hope for it than they have now.

Ironically, Clement Atlee claims Morris for the Labour Party!

Thompson accurately states that "Morris' claim to importance as a political theorist rests upon two grounds. First, he was one of the earliest, and remains one of the most original and creative thinkers within the Marxist tradition in England. Second, he was a pioneer of constructive thought as to the organization and manifestations of social life within Communist society." In addition to many essays on the latter subject, Morris also wrote *News from Nowhere,* a Utopian novel, different from all other Utopian works in that it is a social prophecy based on scientific Marxism. As Morris himself promises at the end of *News,* "if others can see it as I have seen it, then it may be called a vision rather than a dream."

The same moral realism that guided Morris to an orthodox Marxist position governed the rest of his life. His integrity as a young man had made him join the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood in protest at the sham art and over-done artifacts of a Victorian England. Many of the ideas of the Pre-Raphaelites, however, were eventually adopted and perverted by the wealthy classes, with the same lack of taste and honesty they showed in their tea-time dabbling in "socialist" ideas.

Morris' realistic philosophy is also manifested by his concern for the ugliness of the workers' lives. His firm in Oxford Street provided the workers with not only higher wages and shorter hours than were known for comparative work in all England, but also with clean, colorful, and artistically pleasing surroundings. A constantly repeated idea in all his essays and lectures is that labor must be limited in duration, done in clean and agreeable surroundings, and be meaningful and artistically satisfying to both the worker-creator and the eventual user. "Useful Work Versus Useless Toil" is an essay that differentiates between labor one is forced to do for profit and labor one willingly does for pleasure.

Finally, Morris' stature grows with the reiteration of the principle of "hope" in all his socialist writings. His best socialist poem, centering on the Paris Commune, is called *The Pilgrims of Hope.* This poem, celebrating a short triumph and then terrible defeat for the working class, begins with "The Message of the March Wind":

> . . . "Rise up on the morrow
> And go on your ways toward the doubt and the strife;
> Join hope to our hope and blend sorrow with sorrow,
> And seek for men's love in the short days of life."

Morris' last years saw not only reformist-Fabian victories, but also the final disillusion of the "great" 19th Century of Commerce. This disillusion is honestly expressed in the finest literature of the time; e.g., Matthew Arnold's famous poem "Dover Beach" that sees the world as a "darkling plain . . . where ignorant armies clash by night." As Thompson writes, "against this tide, Morris alone stood with full assurance, with conscious confidence in life. The rock he stood upon was his Socialist convictions, his scientific understanding of history. The name which he gave to this rock was 'Hope.' "

The Invisible Third

by Maria di Savio

THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES by Michael Harrington. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962; 191 pages; $4.00.

Besides including up-to-date facts and statistics, this book by a young man originally from the Catholic Worker movement, now a reformist socialist, contributes some new ideas to the numerous studies of poverty in the U.S. Among these new facts are first, that the poor are, paradoxically, extremely numerous yet "invisible," and second, that there is a psychology of poverty.

Harrington gives the figure of 50,000,000 people or 25% of the total population, as the number of American poor, using an annual income of $3,500 for an urban family of four as the cut-off figure. He expands the number of poor, however, when discussing what he calls the American "welfare state." He contends that the "lower third," economically speaking, is not benefitted by our "welfare state" that, instead, caters to the "middle third." Anyway, whether it is one-third or one-fourth of the nation that is poor, it is the author's thesis that the poor are "invisible." How could such a large section of the population be invisible to the rest? Primarily because slums (both rural and urban) and ghettoes are far from the eyes of suburbia and the urban middle class. In addition, cheap mass produced clothes can give anyone a respectable appearance. Harrington notes, "it is much easier in the United States to be decently dressed than it is to be decently housed, fed, or doctored."

The second "new" fact of *The Other America* is hardly new to socialists, but to the person brain-washed by the bourgeois philosophy that only the lazy and/or wicked are poor, the emphasis Harrington gives to the psychology of poverty can be surprising — and instructive. The title of the chapter in which he specifically describes the emotions of poverty is called "The Twisted Spirit." As throughout his book, Harrington here backs up his conclusions with facts from reputable studies, and infuses an element of immediacy with his own experiences while doing voluntary work in Catholic Worker houses. In this chapter, he cites a study by Hollingshead & Redlich, which discovered that the bottom fifth of the 100,000 people in New Haven, Conn., had **40%** more treated mental illnesses than the top fifth. The study does not, of course, refer to those illnesses of the poor that remain **untreated.** In addition, the illnesses of the New Haven impoverished were **qualitatively** different: they were of a far more serious nature than those of the other groups in the community. As for the "vitality" of slum violence, glamorized by middle-class pseudo-Rousseaus such as the producers of **West Side Story,** Harrington points out that "this violence is the creature of that most artificial environment the slum. It is a product of human density and misery. And far from being an aspect of personality that is symptomatic of health, it is one more way in which the poor are driven to hurt themselves."

Mr. Harrington's wide range of ex-

perience leads him to include every aspect of poverty in his book, from the rural poor to the urban minority poor, including the newly unemployed who never knew poverty until automation bounced them from their jobs. Even the Bowery alcoholics and the voluntary "intellectual poor" — the Bohemians — are described and analyzed. Understandably, the writer's sympathy becomes caustic in an undercurrent of irony, as shown in the title "The Golden Years" for the chapter detailing the physical and psychological degradation imposed on older people. This irony sometimes breaks out into angry denunciation of the callousness of the American "prosperous" majority. Here, of course, is where Harrington commits his gravest error: the majority of Americans are **not** prosperous, and we do **not** have a welfare state that is fattening up the "middle third." Harrington himself cites the recent budget figure of about $6,-140 annual income necessary for an urban family of four, as figured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since the average weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing is $95.91 (for March, 1962, as quoted in **Monthly Labor Review**, June, 1962), or less than $5200 a year, obviously factory workers (those in this book's "middle third") are making less than the minimum necessary for anything but a substandard existence. (Harrington, if I remember correctly — and since there is no index, re-checking is difficult — does not give wages of production workers.)

The book's solution to America's poverty is utopian, based on gross misunderstandings of the nature of capitalism. While the author sees that "poverty in the United States is supported by forces with great political and economic power," and that union leaders and liberals are in the same party as southern conservatives, he nevertheless suggests that the "friends of the poor . . . the American labor movement and . . . the middle-class liberals" should somehow pressure Washington to extend present welfare measures to the "lower third." Harrington does not see that the essence of capitalism is the existence of two basic classes, and only one of these classes, the ruling class, can have social and economic security. The starving poor and the underpaid proletariat will suffer so long as capitalism exists.

A Bitter Message

by Martha Curti

ANOTHER COUNTRY, by James Baldwin. The Dial Press, New York, 1962. 436 pp.

NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME; More Notes of a Native Son. By James Baldwin. The Dial Press, New York, 1961. 241 pp.

Almost every writer must wonder, at one time or another, whether his readers "get the message" he is trying to put across. "The message" in James Baldwin's two latest books, a novel and a collection of essays, is one which many readers, in particular white liberals, but by no means excluding white radicals, do not want to get. Yet if Baldwin's feelings about white people are at all representative of the attitudes of large numbers of Negroes, and there is no reason to doubt this, then the white liberals and radicals had better get the message, and fast.

Another Country explores with honest, unsentimental (to put it mildly) penetration various human relationships. All the characters are lonely, and struggle in vain for some kind of love relationship which can give their lives purpose and meaning. Most of the relationships in the book are highly contradictory: a great love and tenderness is inseparably entwined with envy, hostility, and the desire for revenge, which in some cases manifest themselves in the form of violence. This ambivalence is expressed most clearly by the two Negro protagonists — Rufus, a jazz musician, and his sister Ida. Their relationships with their white lovers (in Rufus' case, both male and female) tend toward mutual destruction, which in the case of Rufus and his Southern white girl friend, Leona, is realized, with Leona going crazy and Rufus throwing himself off the George Washington Bridge.

The question of color pervades the relationships: in all the intimate dealings between black and white there is a basic core of distrust: "Why is that person bothering with me? Are they, whatever they say, using me because of my color?" This is what may shock the well-intentioned white do-gooders — the realization that, despite all their good intentions, they are not trusted, and indeed, serve often as objects of revenge for centuries of oppression. The passion with which Baldwin's novel conveys this idea can leave no doubt of its truthfulness. Let Rufus and Ida speak for themselves:

Rufus: "How I hate them — all those white sons of bitches out there. They're trying to kill me, you think I don't know? They got the world on a string, man, the miserable white cock suckers, and they tying that string around my neck, they killing **me** . . . . Sometimes I lie here and I listen — just listen. They out there, scuffling, making that change they think it's going to last forever. Sometimes I lie here and listen, listen for a bomb, man, to fall on this city and make all that noise stop. I listen to hear them moan, I want them to bleed and choke, I want to hear them **crying**, man, for somebody to come help them. They'll cry a long time before I come down there."

And Ida: "'But, Cass, ask yourself, look out and ask yourself — wouldn't you hate all white people if they kept you in prison here?' They were rolling up startling Seventh Avenue. The entire population seemed to be in the streets, draped, almost, from lampposts, stoops, and hydrants, and walking through the traffic as though it were not there. 'Kept you here, and stunted you and starved you, and made you watch your mother and father and sister and lover and brother and son and daughter die or go mad or go under, before your very eyes? And not in a hurry, like from one day to the next, but, every day, every day, for years, for generations? Shit. They keep you here because you're black, the filthy, white cock suckers, while they go around jerking themselves off with all that jazz about the land of the free and the home of the brave. And they want you to jerk yourself off with that same music too, only, keep your distance. Some days, honey, I wish I could turn myself into one big fist and grind this miserable country to powder. Some days, I don't believe it has a right to exist.'"

Of all the relationships dealt with, the only ones based upon mutual respect, loyalty, and tenderness are those involving Eric, an actor, and (most of the time) a homosexual; and even Eric cannot surmount the difficulties inherent in cutting the racial barrier. Using the novel as a vehicle of expression — a means which, by the very fact of its existence, intensifies, condenses, and therefore, distorts, to some extent, what goes on in life — Baldwin explores the antagonisms that society forces upon black and white, man and woman. Baldwin's glorification of homosexuality, however, hardly seems in keeping with the perceptiveness of the book in general. Surely there is just as much, if not more, hostility, envy, and suspicion in homosexual relationships as in any other sort. It is no better a solution to the vexing problems of living in this society than is that of drug addiction, which

is enjoying a certain vogue among several current American writers.

Incidentally, Eric is the only character in the book who comes to life. Though the others on occasion do things and have thoughts and attitudes that are convincing, as a whole they do not seem real. Despite this, and a few other minor weaknesses from a literary point of view, the perceptiveness about people and society, and the honesty and sometimes brilliance with which this is presented, make *Another Country* a book of major import.

In *Nobody Knows My Name* many of the same problems are dealt with from another perspective. The sickness of society which is so graphically portrayed in personal terms in *Another Country* is here illustrated from more of a social framework. The essays deal with a variety of subjects: the Negro student movement, the Muslims, Africa, the problems of the writer in general and the Negro writer in particular, the South, Harlem. Portraits of people abound — the Negro boy who singlehandedly was "integrating" a Southern white high school; the cops; and other, less important people, like Andre Gide, Ingmar Bergman, Richard Wright, Norman Mailer. Baldwin's views on the Negro question are best expressed in a pair of essays: "Fifth Avenue, Uptown," on Harlem, and "East River, Downtown," on the UN riots following the death of Lumumba. A few of Baldwin's remarks may serve as a temptation to read them all:

On the housing projects: "The projects in Harlem are hated. They are hated almost as much as policemen, and this is saying a great deal. And they are hated for the same reason: both reveal, unbearably, the real attitude of the white world, no matter how many liberal speeches are made, no matter how many lofty editorials are written, no matter how many civil-rights commissions are set up . . . . Whatever money is now being earmarked to improve this, or any other ghetto, might as well be burnt. A ghetto can be improved in one way only: out of existence."

On the cops: "The white policeman standing on a Harlem street corner finds himself at the very center of the revolution now occurring in the world."

On the Lumumba demonstration: "What I find appalling — and really dangerous — is the American assumption that the Negro is so contented with his lot here that only the cynical agents of a foreign power can rouse him to protest. It is a notion which contains a gratuitous insult, implying, as it does, that Negroes can make no move unless they are manipulated."

On white liberals: "Negroes know how little most white people are prepared to implement their words with deeds, how little, when the chips are down, they are prepared to risk. And this long history of moral evasion has had an unhealthy effect on the total life of the country, and has eroded whatever respect Negroes may once have felt for white people."

On Cuba: "I very strongly doubt that any Negro youth, now approaching maturity, and with the whole, vast world before him, is willing, say, to settle for Jim Crow in Miami, when he can — or, before the travel ban, *could* — feast at the welcome table in Havana. And he need not, to prefer Havana, have any pro-Communist, or, for that matter, pro-Cuban, or pro-Castro sympathies: he need merely prefer not to be treated as a second-class citizen."

On "waiting": "The time is forever behind us when Negroes could be expected to 'wait.' What is demanded now, and at once, is not that Negroes continue to adjust themselves to the cruel racial pressures of life in the United States but that the United States readjust itself to the facts of life in the present world."

On paternalism: "Men do not like to be protected, it emasculates them. This is what black men know, it is the reality they have lived with; it is what white men do not want to know. It is not a pretty thing to be a father and be ultimately dependent on the power and kindness of some other man for the well-being of your house.

On freedom: "Let me point out to you that freedom is not something that anybody can be given; freedom is something people take . . ."

These are not merely bright sayings, well-turned phrases, as their quotation out of context might imply. Every one of them is a conclusion, based on much concrete experience and thought: enough of the concreteness appears in the essays to make the conclusions absolutely convincing.

It would be easy to become irritated at the intrusion of Baldwin himself in most of these essays. After all, the discovery of James Baldwin's identity is the task of Baldwin himself, and, as such, is of little interest to anyone else. One cannot deny, however, that Baldwin's ideas and attitudes are of unquestionable importance to all of us; that these ideas can exist only through the instrument of Baldwin as a personality; and if such a self-consciousness is a necessary predecessor to these ideas, so be it. As Baldwin himself says more than once, it is impossible to face in others that which you can't face in yourself.

These two books can best be understood and appreciated in reference to each other. Both the essays and the novel are honest, as honest as Baldwin knows how to be — honest at the risk of alienating the majority of Americans (but in this respect, Baldwin had nothing to lose anyway), and even when his honesty leads, as it somethimes does, to an unflattering picture of himself. In his essay on Mailer he makes this explicit as the task of the writer: "I think we do have a responsibility, not only to ourselves and to our own time, but to those who are coming after us. (I refuse to believe that no one is coming after us.) And I suppose that this responsibility can only be discharged by dealing as truthfully as we know how with our present fortunes, these present days."

Stalin Speaks

by Fred Mazelis

CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN by Milovan Djilas. Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1962. $3.95. 211 pp.

This is probably the most valuable book yet written by Milovan Djilas. It is certainly more profitable reading than the much heralded *The New Class;* for in his latest work Djilas sets himself simpler goals. In *Conversations With Stalin,* unlike *The New Class,* Djilas is not trying to set forth a theoretical view of the society in the Soviet bloc. He is simply trying to give an account of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the crucial period from 1944-1948. He begins this task, of course, with the tremendous advantage of having been a participant in this history. His three trips to the Soviet Union, in 1944, 1945, and 1948 form the body of the book.

Djilas makes a very worthwhile contribution in two areas. First, he provides a deeper understanding of the Yugoslav Revolution itself. Second, he depicts in marvelous detail the individuals who functioned as the political leadership of Stalin's bureaucracy in this period.

In many specific instances, Djilas illuminates the relationship between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Yugoslav Revolution. In his opening, Djilas tells us that "Moscow could never quite understand the realities of the revolution in Yugoslavia, that is, the fact that in Yugoslavia, simultaneously with the resistance to the forces of occupation, a domestic revolution was also going on." To this it need only be added that Moscow, in reality did not want to recognize any revolutionary developments.

The book abounds with examples of the theory and practice of peaceful coexistence as enunciated by the Stalin-

ists. There is an especially excellent depiction of Stalin's cynical attitude towards the revolution in Albania. At one point Stalin says, "We have no special interest in Albania. We agree to Yugoslavia swallowing up Albania!" At another point in 1944 Stalin expressed great apprehension that the red stars on the caps of the Yugoslav partisans might frighten the English. In a meeting in Moscow in 1948 Stalin disposes of the Greek Revolution by saying, "The uprising in Greece has to fold up."

The author paints some valuable personal portraits of the top Stalinists. Of the descriptions of Manuilsky, Dimitrov, Bulganin, Zhukov, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Beria, Molotov, as well as Stalin, the portrait of Beria is perhaps the most brilliant. "Beria was also a rather short man — in Stalin's Politburo there was hardly anyone taller than himself. He, too, was somewhat plump, greenish pale, and with soft damp hands. With his square-cut mouth and bulging eyes behind his pince-nez, he suddenly reminded me of Vujkovic, one of the chiefs of the Belgrade Royal Police who specialized in torturing Communists. It took an effort to dispel the unpleasant comparison, which was all the more nagging because the similarity extended even to his expression — that of a certain self-satisfaction and irony mingled with a clerk's obsequiousness and solicitude."

Following the Stalin-Tito split in 1948, Djilas continued as a top leader, in fact the right hand man of Tito. Unlike the vast majority of Stalinist political leaders then or since, Djilas began to question in a serious manner his entire political development and perspective. Around 1953, this reevaluation resulted in a pronounced move away from Titoism as well as Stalinism. In his reaction against the basic character of the Yugoslav regime, he confused Stalinism with Marxism and Leninism, and threw them all out together. Djilas adopted for his political credo a variant of the Social-Democratic revision of Marxism. He has since become the darling of the Social Democratic and liberal spokesmen for "enlightened" capitalism.

The key to an appreciation of the latest book is that, notwithstanding Djilas' political degeneration, he was able to rely upon his rich personal experience to provide us with an extremely worthwhile study. The book is not adulterated by pro-imperialist propaganda, nor does the author digress from his main subject to theoretical areas in which he has already demonstrated his incompetent anti-materialist approach.

The fact that Djilas is now in jail for the "crime" of publishing this book cannot be ignored. Everyone knows that he poses no grave danger to the Yugoslav workers state. The action of the Yugoslav government confirms the bureaucratic nature of the regime. Although we have no sympathy for Djilas' politics we unreservedly condemn this brutal attempt to suppress his views.

A History of Communism

by Tim Wohlforth

A Documentary History of Communism, edited by Robert V. Daniels. Vintage books, New York, 1962. Volume I, 322 pp. Volume II, 394 pp. Paperback edition. $1.65 per volume.

One by-product of the deterioration of influence of the United States throughout the world has been an increase in publication of Marxist works by commercial publishing houses. It seems there is a curiosity in what the opposition is thinking.

One of the more interesting projects of this kind is Robert Daniels' compilation of original source material related to the broadly defined category of "Communism" over a fifty year period and including contributions from most countries of the world. Daniels is a professor at the Harvard University Russian Research Center.

Professor Daniels faced the choice, considering the space limitations imposed even within the framework of two reasonably plump paperbacks, to either reprint at length a few of the more well known classics of Marxist literature or to give a sampling of a greater variety of material even if this meant printing only brief passages from any one work. He chose the latter course with the inevitable result of giving the reader, time and time again, a tantalizing taste of something one would wish to feast on at great length. Daniels partially makes up for this serious limitation by his knowledgeable, and in general quite fair, choice of a very wide variety of material including a good deal of oppositional documents usually ignored by historians. If one were to criticize Daniels on his arbitrary selection of materials (any selection must be somewhat arbitrary), it would be to suggest that he has not been quite fair to Rosa Luxemburg. He included only two extracts from her writings, both of which are critical of Lenin. This tends to give a very slanted picture of her true role in this period as one of the staunchest defenders of revolutionary Marxism.

The reader can sample the actual writings of Lenin's ultra-left opposition in 1909 led by Bogdanov, the Democratic Centralist and Workers Opposition groups of the 1920's and, of special importance, an interesting selection of material representative of the Trotskyist Left Opposition. Rather than relying on easily available material of Trotsky's, Daniels has utilized the Trotsky Archives at Harvard and in particular the Russian Bulletin of the Opposition and therefore has included material previously unavailable in English. Thus we find such rarities as the Declaration of the Forty-Six which began the struggle of the Left Opposition in 1923, Preobrazhensky on industrialization from the 1926 period, and a series of very moving writings on bureaucracy by Christian Rakovsky. These latter writings are alone worth the price of the book.

Rakovsky's writings in 1928 and 1929 will, perhaps, give one a feel of the best of the material to be found in these two volumes:

> "Neither the working class nor the party is **physically** or **morally** what it was ten years ago. I think I do not exaggerate when I say that the party member of 1917 would hardly recognize himself in the person of the party member of 1928 . . . . Clinging to its unlimited apparatus absolutism, afraid of losing power, the party leadership has sacrificed the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the Soviet state, and of the world revolution, for the sake of preserving itself . . . Centralism kills the real initiative of the masses . . . . Bureaucracy has castrated the class and revolutionary content of the trade unions. . . . The opposition in 1923-24 foresaw the vast harm to the proletarian dictatorship which stems from the perversion of the party regime. Events have fully justified its prognosis: the enemy crept in through the bureaucratic window."

Another highly important document of interest to this day is the open letter of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party until 1927. To this day the Mao leadership seeks to blame the opportunistic line towards the Kuomintang of that period on Ch'en alone. Ch'en, in this document, sets the record straight: "We must openly and objectively admit that the whole past and present opportunistic policy came and now comes from the Third International. The Comintern must bear the responsibility. The Chinese party, which had scarcely emerged from infancy, did not have the capacity to create a theory for itself and then establish a policy." It is these roots of opportunism that can be found in the Stalinist degeneration of the USSR that Mao to this day seeks to hide.

Also of considerable value is the material in Volume II of the collection

which contains the writings of the various currents within the Stalinist camp in the postwar period. Such material, while brief, is helpful in an analysis of Stalinism and the internal stresses within it.

All in all these two volumes are a necessary addition to the library of serious Marxist students. To a person new to Marxist thought they offer a little taste of the richness of Marxist theory especially in the period before the degeneration of the Russian Revolution, as well as a feel of what the struggle against Stalinism was all about. Perhaps some day a bit more than fragments will be available of such great Marxists as Rakovsky and Preobrazhensky. I expect the brief extract in this volume will suffice for Bogdanov.

Stalinism in Eastern Europe

by Tim Wohlforth

THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTION by Hugh Seton-Watson. Frederick A. Praeger. New York, 1961, 435 pp. Paperback edition $2.25.

THE SOVIET BLOC — UNITY AND CONFLICT by Zbigniew K. Brezezinski. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. 543 pp. Revised Paperback edition $2.75.

The expansion of Stalinism into Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period has been a subject of considerable theoretical, as well as practical political, interest to socialists. A detailed study of these events can prove to be a very valuable source of knowledge on the nature of Stalinism in general as well as on the role of Stalinism in this particular, and by no means unimportant, region.

The social overturn in this region, which followed close upon the introduction of the Marshall Plan into Western Europe and the intensification of the Cold War, represented the first sizable, permanent extension of workers states beyond the borders of the USSR. The Hungarian and Polish Revolutions in 1956 represented the most profound challenge to the bureaucratic caste that has ever occurred. These events illustrate why, to this day, an understanding of the development of the Eastern European region in the postwar period is of such critical importance to an understanding of the expansion and the disintegration of Stalinism.

Far more reliable information is available on Eastern Europe than on the USSR or China. This is because of the peculiar stormy history of the region. The Tito break in 1949, the Nagy episode in 1953, and the Hungarian and Polish events in 1956 all served to bring out in the open a wealth of information and data on political, social and economic developments in Eastern Europe.

These two books are among the better products of the "Russian Studies" academic activity in the United States and England. As such they, of course, bear the imprint of the staunch supporters of the West which staff our universities. However, despite this bias, a good deal of important and useful information can be gleaned from these books by the critical reader.

Hugh Seton-Watson's book is the most dated of the two for, except for two short and unimportant prefaces, the bulk of the book was written in 1951. However, in the period he does cover, Seton-Watson gives a better empirical picture than Brzezinski. This is especially true of his account of events in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, in which his native Britain has had more than an academic interest over the years. Particularly devastating, considering his bias, is his account of the role of the Chetniks in Yugoslavia and comparable forces in Albania and Greece as actual collaborators of the Nazis. The native capitalists in these countries prefered domination by foreign capitalism in its most viscious fascist form to an agrarian revolution in their own country.

Brzezinski is attempting a much more ambitious project than Seton-Watson. His aim is to analyze those elements of unity and disunity within the Soviet Bloc as a whole. In actuality the bulk of the book is on Eastern Europe which is clearly the field of Brzezinski's major interest and competence.

There are moments when Brzezinski's very real knowledge of East European events leads him to conclusions which contradict his essentially Western bias. Dr. Brzezinski, being a respected Columbia University professor and thus a reliable pillar of our society, believes in the prevailing myth of the imperialist nature of the USSR. The Soviet Union's expansion into Eastern Europe is pictured as part of an overall plan to conquer the world while the West is the injured party meekly defending itself against the behemoth.

However, Brzezinski finds himself contradicting this picture of the world once he attempts to understand concrete developments in Eastern Europe. He disagrees with the more simplistic of his colleagues who ignore the basic difference in Soviet policy in Eastern Europe before 1947 and after 1947, who see only a conscious Machiavellian drive to seize power and to set up a totalitarian regime (this seems to be Seton-Watson's view). Rather he insists that the Stalinists consciously sought in the period prior to 1947 to contain social change within the framework of the coalition governments they established with bourgeois parties. He also notes that there existed a good deal of popular support in these countries for radical social change: "To the peasants, prospects of land reform held out a vision for the fulfillment of their most cherished dream, and one much too long denied . . . To most people in war-devastated East Europe, rapid economic reconstruction was the most vital issue, even more so than politics. And to a majority of them state planning appeared necessary and logical."

In describing the aims of the USSR in the "Buffer Zone" in the first period after the war, Brzezinski lists only one of an aggressive nature. This is simply an unsubstantiated restatement of the standard thesis of the aggressive imperialistic, power-seeking nature of the USSR. The other four aims listed are purely defensive. It is clear from any serious study of these developments that the USSR carried through a social transformation in this region in order to guarantee a strategic buffer between itself and the Western capitalist countries — in order to prevent these countries becoming bases for aggression against the USSR.

The fundamental insecurity of this Stalinist method of defense was clearly shown in the Hungarian and Polish events. But to view these defensive actions of the USSR, even though they had a deeply reactionary aspect to them, as aggressive imperialism is to fall prey to the pressures within our own country, to lose a truly objective understanding of world events. Brzezinski is serious enough about his studies to let a bit of the truth leak through. This is all one can expect from such academicians, but it is nonetheless of considerable value.

A Crowded Planet

by Shane Mage

COMMON SENSE ABOUT A STARVING WORLD by Ritchie Calder. MacMillan, N.Y. 1962, $2.95, pp. 176.

At present there are three billion human inhabitants on the surface of this planet. For the majority of them — of us — hunger, malnutrition, are the "normal" human condition. They dwell perpetually on the margin of starvation. Yet, under the life-extending impetus of modern preventive medicine, this population cannot but increase to four billion by 1980 and, if present birth rates are not radically lowered, must exceed **six** billion by the end of the century.

Despite all efforts to increase the food

supply will this exploding population, as the modern disciples of Malthus predict, inevitably push mankind beyond the margin of starvation? The current economic crisis in China is proof that this danger is quite real and imminent. Can it be overcome? In *Common Sense About a Starving World* Prof. Ritchie Calder argues, in a simple and direct exposition aimed at the broadest public, that the real question is not whether starvation **can** be prevented, but whether it **will** be.

All too frequently the problem of population is posed in the falsified form of a debate between the followers of Malthus and of St. Paul. To the "Malthusian" contention that food supplies cannot be increased drastically, leaving rigid limitation of population as the only salvation, the "Pauline" spokesmen John XXIII and Mao Tse-tung reply that if every baby brings an additional mouth to feed it also brings an additional pair of hands able to produce more than enough nourishment. Rapid population growth, far from being considered a danger, is thus presented as a positive good.

The "common sense" view of Prof. Calder refutes both these dogmatic positions. A brief but telling survey of the world's agricultural resources shows that even on the basis of **present** technology, through raising the productivity of now-cultivated land to the average level of the advanced countries and through extension of cultivation into what are now desert and tundra regions, it is possible to provide a satisfactory diet for a greatly augmented world population.

But this should give scant comfort to the "Pauline" anti-Malthusians. As Calder points out, "the alarming factor is not the number, but the time." The people of the world demand, and are entitled to, a decent standard of living not centuries from now but within the next few decades. This can be achieved **if** a vast and carefully planned program of investment is carried out on a world scale (a program which, as Calder recognizes, will far surpass what the advanced capitalist societies are presently willing to accept).

Even under the most favorable form of social organization this development effort will for a long time be restrained by objective limits: the full utilization of existing productive capacity and the finite, depletable reserves of the natural factors of production (land surface, timber, organic fuels, minerals). If these limits apply for the next 40 years (and the longer the delay before a real development program is started the longer will they apply) a difference of 1% per year in the rate of population growth will mean a difference of **50%** in the average living standard at the end of the century! In fact the difference would be even greater, since every retardation in the increase of living standards is paid for by a lower rate of increase of labor productivity.

It thus emerges clearly that birth control as the major factor in population planning is not a substitute for intensive economic development but a necessary component part of an effort aimed first of all at a rapid increase of production. As Calder states in conclusion, "I am, as I hope this book has shown, completely committed to family planning and population control but I am equally convinced that we shall not substantially modify the figures for 1980. It is therefore essential that we contrive the means to feed them all in twenty years time. We must mobilize the wisdom and the science of the world — put the best brains and the most money behind the efforts to resolve our predicament."

How is this to be done, given the willingness of the great imperialist powers to squander vast resources in war production and their refusal to allot more than derisory alms to world economic development? Our response: socialist reorganization of the world economy. Calder, though his approach is implicity socialist, confines himself to posing the task, not discussion of the answers. Subject to this reservation, and given its purpose as a popularization of the subject, Prof. Calder's book has considerable value.

Revolution in Lower California

by Fred Halstead

THE DESERT REVOLUTION. By Lowell L. Blaisdell, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wis. 1962. 268 pp. $6.00.

This is the first readily available piece of research in the English language on that part of the Mexican Revolution which most directly involved the U.S. radical movement, the guerilla warfare in Baja California in 1911 under the leadership of the Liberal Party headed by the anarchist Ricardo Florez Magon. Magon is well known in Mexico as the Great Precursor of the Mexican Revolution but almost unknown today in the United States where as a revolutionary exile he did much of his life's work and in one of whose federal prisons he died.

Several years before the events in Baja California which are the central subject of this book, Magon published the most influential pre-revolution newspapers — printed in the U.S. and distributed underground in Mexico — and organized the first political guerilla warfare against the tyranny of Porfiro Diaz. For this, Magon was jailed in the U.S. When he got out in 1910 he set up a headquarters in Los Angeles, began publishing his newspaper and got support from the large Southern California Mexican population as well as from U.S. radicals of European as well as Mexican ancestry.

In January of 1911, the Magonistas began the Baja California campaign by capturing the border town of Mexicali and raising the red flag inscribed with the words "Land and Liberty," a slogan later made famous in the southern part of mainland Mexico by Emiliano Zapata. They began recruiting an army composed of four types: Magonista Mexicans; U.S. members of the Industrial Workers of the World, the revolutionary union active at that time among migratory workers in California; Cocopah Indians who were indigenous to the area and brutally treated by Diaz officials; and military adventurers who drifted in for the excitement.

Magon's plan was to secure a base in Baja California, move into mainland Mexico linking up with his small groups there, and develop a force determined to carry through a full scale social revolution rather than the mere political reforms being advocated by Francisco Madero who had become the rallying center for the revolutionary forces in mainland Mexico.

In spite of initial military successes, Magon's forces failed to break out of the isolated "wild west" peninsula of Baja California, and after about three months were defeated by the combined efforts of the remnants of the Diaz regime — which the Maderistas had meantime defeated on the mainland — Madero's Federal forces, and the U.S. army which sealed off the border to the Magonistas but not to the Federals.

Blaisdell is probably correct in pointing to Magon's shortcomings as a man of action as a big contributing factor to the collapse of his military campaign. Magon spent the whole campaign in literary and organizing work in Los Angeles, leaving crucial military-political decisions to be made at the scene by leaders elected in the field on the basis of their military ability alone.

The book contains a detailed treatment of the legend — spread by the Diaz regime, by Maderistas fearful of Magon's anarchist social revolutionary theories, and by a devilishly effective Hollywood press agent — that the Magonistas were engaged in a "filibuster" to separate Baja California from Mexico and annex it to the U.S. Credence was lent to this manufactured myth by the irresponsible actions and statements of some of the military adventurers in the Magonista forces — before the Mexicans and IWW's threw

them out — as well as by a number of other tragi-comic events. One of these was the mental collapse of the only U.S. State Department official in the area — the consul at Ensenada — who started believing the press agent stories and embellishing them on his own in a series of wild dispatches to Washington.

After the collapse of his military forces, Magon was convicted of violation of the U.S. neutrality laws and imprisoned. Released in 1914 he resumed his revolutionary writings, but was shortly imprisoned again for attacking the Garranza regime which the U.S. had decided to recognize. Released on appeal, he was again imprisoned in 1918 as part of the violent witch hunt against radicals which accompanied World War I.

He died in November, 1922 in the U.S. federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, still maintaining that "Mexico's revolutionary spark is the beginning of the purifying fire that from one moment to another will envelope every country in the world."

Periodicals in Review

Negro Nationalism

A number of articles are beginning to appear in the radical and liberal press commenting on the new trends within the Negro movement. The most interesting and stimulating material yet published on the subject appears in the current issue of *Studies on the Left* (Vol. 2, No. 3, 1962). *Studies* deserves a good deal of credit for publishing John Schultz's interview with Robert F. Williams, which captures so well the mood and spirit of the Negro militant, and Harold Cruse's incisive article "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American." All in all the current issue of *Studies* is perhaps the best these Wisconsin students have yet put out.

Of particular interest in Harold Cruse's article is his critique of the Stalinist approach to Negro history (an approach which he insists on attributing to "Marxists" in general). Cruse feels that Aptheker and other Stalinist historians view the Negro People as an undifferentiated entity with identical interests. With this outlook the Stalinists ignore the very real class differentiations within the Negro community and thus have no way of explaining why the mass of the Negro people have so decisively rejected the leadership of the black bourgeoisie. This leads the Stalinists to simply tail the NAACP, King, CORE leaderships rather than seek an alternative to them. "Lacking a working class character," Cruse comments, "Marxism in the United States cannot objectively analyze the role of the bourgeoisie or take a political position in Negro affairs that would be more in keeping with the aspirations of the masses."

Cruse's comments on the Negro Nationalists are also quite thought-provoking. He feels that the progressive content of this movement has not been fully understood by the radical movement. At the same time he seems to feel that the goals of the Nationalists are utopian. "White society, the Muslims feel, is sick, immoral, dishonest, and filled with hate for non-whites. Their rejection of white society is analogous to the colonial people's rejection of imperialist rule. The difference is only that people in colonies can succeed and Negro Nationalists cannot. The peculiar position of Negro Nationalists in the United States requires them to set themselves against the dominance of whites and still manage to live in the same country."

It will be through the proper fusion of the Negro's legitimate striving for self-identity and rejection of white bourgeois culture with the elements of class identity and struggle which will produce an effective Negro revolutionary movement. If Jim Crow cannot be rooted out of the fabric of capitalist society as Cruse correctly insists and if a national solution to the Negro question is utopian, then there exists only one other solution — the overthrow of the existing social structure and the establishment of a socialist equalitarian society. This task cannot be completed by the Negro alone. He needs, as an ally, the white working class.

The proper balance of these elements into a correct program, the consolidation of a revolutionary Negro movement around such a program, all this is not a simple task. It will take much effort, much discussion, much thought. Contributions of the quality of Harold Cruse's will be most essential.

Peaceful Politics

There is no protest movement in the United States so completely and thoroughly dominated by a "classless" middle class outlook and ideology as the peace movement. But, paradoxically, peace is a question above all which can only be resolved through the most fundamental revolutionary destruction of the social system which is driving the world madly towards war and universal death. Perhaps it is a feeling that this is one battle that must be fought through resolutely, uncompromisingly, which makes so many in the peace movement shrink away from any battle at all — once the battle is engaged the logic of it is difficult to avoid.

Currently we have read, with considerable upset of our digestive system, two typical products of this middle class mood which so dominates the peace movement: the special issue of *New University Thought*, "Peace, 1962," and "Peace Takes to the Hustings" by Mary M. Grooms in the July 28 issue of the *Nation*.

Ten contributors write in *New University Thought* on the "Politics of Peace" and Mrs. Grooms picks up on the same theme in the *Nation*. Taken together these writings express rather well the spirit of the "new mood" of political activity in peace circles. The *New University* material reads like a primer on the art of licking the boots of the powers that be. Representative William Fitts Ryan's legislative assistant tells you how to influence congressmen while others write on the techniques of organizing "peace lobbies." All the projects seem so senseless, to express such weakness and disorientation. It is difficult to believe that the practitioners of this form of "politics" really believe that the U.S. Government can be tamed into a peace-loving force through the lobbying of Democratic and Republican politicians or supporting the more "peaceful" politicians in primaries. One gets a feeling that all this is simply a substitute for doing nothing, a reaction to the correct feeling that protests and demonstrations are not enough.

None of these writers have any conception of the necessity to take the struggle for peace out of the suburban middle class homes and the intellectual campus community — to seek to mobilize the only force capable of changing modern society, the working class. Rather we find the opposite kind of thinking. Mrs. Grooms feels that it was wrong for the CND in England to support the Labour Party or the peace forces in Canada to support the New Democratic Party. You see, this would "split the peace vote" and who knows how many Conservatives might be willing to sign some sort of peace-loving petition.

Tim Wohlforth

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

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